




























CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Case No. __________________ 1 
Rafey S. Balabanian (SBN 315962) 
rbalabanian@edelson.com 
EDELSON PC 
150 California Street, 18th Floor 
San Francisco, California 94111 
Tel: 415.212.9300 
Fax: 415.373.9435 
Richard Fields (pro hac vice admission to be sought) 
fields@fieldslawpllc.com 
FIELDS PLLC 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 200 
Washington, DC 20006 
Tel: 833.382.9816 
Counsel for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 
JANE DOE, individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
META PLATFORMS, INC. (f/k/a Facebook, 
Inc.), a Delaware corporation,  
Defendant. 
Case No. _________________ 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR: 
(1) STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY
(2) NEGLIGENCE
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff Jane Doe, on behalf of herself and on behalf of a Class defined below, brings 
this Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. 
(f/k/a Facebook, Inc. and d/b/a “Facebook”)1 for compensatory damages, in excess of $150 
billion, in addition to punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial. Plaintiff, for her 
Complaint, alleges as follows: 































   




DETERMINING FOREIGN LAW - NOTICE 
Plaintiff hereby gives notice that, to the extent Defendant Meta Platforms raises the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, as a defense to the claims asserted below, and 
to the extent that the Court were to find that the Communications Decency Act conflicts with 
Burmese law, Burmese law applies. Burmese law does not immunize social media companies for 
their role in inciting violence and contributing to genocide. 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Rohingya people, a Muslim minority historically living in present-day Burma 
(internally renamed Myanmar following a military coup),2 number over 1 million and are the 
largest stateless population in the world. While the Rohingya have long been the victims of 
discrimination and persecution, the scope and violent nature of that persecution changed 
dramatically in the last decade, turning from human rights abuses and sporadic violence into 
terrorism and mass genocide. 
2. A key inflection point for that change was the introduction of Facebook into 
Burma in 2011, which materially contributed to the development and widespread dissemination 
of anti-Rohingya hate speech, misinformation, and incitement of violence—which together 
amounted to a substantial cause, and perpetuation of, the eventual Rohingya genocide. A 
stunning declaration of a former Facebook employee now turned whistleblower, states 
“Facebook executives were fully aware that posts ordering hits by the Myanmar government on 
the minority Muslim Rohingya were spreading wildly on Facebook…”, and that “…the issue of 
the Rohingya being targeted on Facebook was well known inside the company for years.” This 
 
2  Throughout this Complaint, “Myanmar” will be used in reference the ruling military 
government, while “Burma” will be used to refer to the country itself. See U.S. Relations With 
Burma, US STATE DEPARTMENT, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-burma/ (“The military 
government changed the country’s name to ‘Myanmar’ in 1989. The United States government 






























   




information, and the whistleblower’s knowledge of Facebook’s lack of response, led this person 
to conclude: “I, working for Facebook, had been a party to genocide.”3 
3. For years, the Myanmar military, along with the support of civilian terrorists in 
the majority Buddhist population, have treated the Rohingya as less than human, limiting their 
rights, restricting their movements, and committing widespread human rights violations. While 
various incidents of violence occurred periodically for years, nothing could prepare the 
Rohingya, or the international community, for what was to come after Facebook entered the 
picture in 2012.  
4. Following confrontations on the Rakhine State border, the Myanmar military, and 
its civilian conspirators, now armed with Facebook to organize and spread terror, escalated their 
brutal crackdown, carrying out violent acts of ethnic cleansing that defy comprehension.  
5. In the ensuing months and years, tens of thousands of Rohingya were brutally 
murdered, gang raped, and tortured. Men, women, and children were burned alive inside their 
homes and schools. Family members were tortured, raped, and killed in front of each other. More 
than ten thousand lost their lives, while hundreds of thousands were brutalized, maimed, and 
bore witness to indescribable violence and misery that they will carry with them for the rest of 
their lives. Families were destroyed, childhoods were lost, lives were ruined, and entire 
communities were erased from the face of the earth. 
6. As this wave of violence persisted with little end in sight, hundreds of thousands 
of Rohingya fled their home country and sought refuge around the world. The vast majority of 
those refugees ended up, and still live, in Bangladesh in what is now the largest refugee camp in 
the world. Over ten thousand individuals, including Plaintiff, eventually arrived in the United 
States and many are living here under refugee status.  
 
3  Craig Timberg, New whistleblower claims Facebook allowed hate, illegal activity to go 
































   




7. The Rohingya people who are left in Burma live under constant threat of arrest, 
violence, abuse, and discrimination. Those who made it out, too, live in fear for themselves and 
their loved ones. Many Rohingya refugees around the world live in abject poverty and in highly 
unstable situations that could change at any time depending on the political climate of the 
country in which they now reside. Even those in the Bangladesh refugee camp are not safe: In 
September 2021, a well-known and outspoken Rohingya community leader was murdered in the 
camp, with many believing that the murder was carried out by supporters of the Myanmar 
military.  
8. Woven throughout the years of this horrific tragedy are two constants: (1) the 
enduring resilience of the Rohingya people and (2) the willingness of Defendant Meta to 
knowingly facilitate the spread of anti-Rohingya hate speech, misinformation, and the 
widespread incitement of violence against the Rohingya people. 
9. So deep was Facebook’s penetration into daily life in Burma and its role in the 
out-of-control spread of anti-Rohingya content, that Marzuki Darusman, chairman of the U.N. 
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, described Facebook as having 
played a “determining role” in the genocide. And, worst of all, it allowed the dissemination of 
hateful and dangerous misinformation to continue for years, long after it was repeatedly put on 
notice of the horrific and deadly consequences of its inaction.  
10. Amazingly (at least to those not privy to Facebook’s inner workings), Facebook 
has long been aware that hateful, outraged, and politically extreme content (especially content 
attacking a perceived “out-group”) is oxygen to the company’s blood. The more horrendous the 
content, the more it generates “engagement” (a measure of users’ interaction with content on the 
system (“likes,” “shares,” comments, etc.)). As Facebook has determined through years of study 
and analysis: hate and toxicity fuel its growth far more effectively than updates about a user’s 
favorite type of latte. 
11. Rather than taking what it’s learned to change its practices, Facebook made a 






























   




this opportunity, prioritizing divisive and polarizing content, including hate speech and 
misinformation about targeted groups, when delivering content to users and recommending that 
users make new connections or join new groups. 
12. Facebook participates in and contributes to the development and creation of 
divisive content, including hate speech and misinformation. By ensuring that more users see and 
respond—in the form of “likes,” “shares,” and comments—to such toxic content, Facebook’s 
algorithms train users to post more hate speech and misinformation in order to garner more 
attention online. 
13. This “growth at all costs” view of Facebook’s business is not speculative, or, for 
that matter, inconsistent with Facebook’s view of itself. Facebook’s Borg-like march toward 
further growth was best captured by one of its highest-ranking executives, Andrew Bosworth, in 
an internal memo circulated after a shooting death in the Chicago was stunningly live streamed 
on Facebook. It stated, in part:  
We connect people. 
 
That can be good if they make it positive. Maybe someone finds 
love. Maybe it even saves the life of someone on the brink of 
suicide. 
 
So we connect more people. 
 
That can be bad if they make it negative. Maybe it costs a life by 
exposing someone to bullies. Maybe someone dies in a terrorist 
attack coordinated on our tools. 
 
And still we connect people. 
 
The ugly truth is that we believe in connecting people so deeply 
that anything that allows us to connect more people more often 
is *de facto* good… 
That’s why all the work we do in growth is justified. All the 
questionable contact importing practices. All the subtle language 
that helps people stay searchable by friends. All of the work we do 
to bring more communication in. The work we will likely have to 
do in China some day. All of it. 
The natural state of the world is not connected. It is not unified. It 
is fragmented by borders, languages, and increasingly by different 































   




In almost all of our work, we have to answer hard questions about 
what we believe. We have to justify the metrics and make sure 
they aren’t losing out on a bigger picture. But connecting people. 
That’s our imperative. Because that’s what we do. We connect 
people.4 
 
14. In short, Facebook sees itself, at best, as an amoral actor on the world stage, with 
the sole objective of growth, regardless of how it impacts its users or the world more generally. 
To be clear, the last five years, and in fact just the last five months, have made it abundantly 
clear that Facebook’s path to promote the very worst of humanity was not the result of a bug, but 
rather a carefully designed feature.5  
15. The manifestation of this can be seen in nearly everything Facebook does. For 
example:  
• Before and after the 2020 election, it failed to stop mass 
publication and reposting of misinformation about the legitimacy 
of the election and the subsequent calls for violence that 
culminated in the January 6th attack on our nation’s Capitol; 
• Facebook has known about human traffickers using its system for 
years, but only after “[i]t got so bad that in 2019”, and Apple 
threatened to pull Facebook and Instagram’s access to the App 
Store, did “Facebook employees rush[] to take down problematic 
content and make emergency policy changes avoid what they 
described as a ‘potentially severe’ consequence for the business.”6; 
• In another ongoing example, throughout the COVID-19 global 
pandemic, Facebook has been a constant vehicle for the mass 
distribution of misinformation on COVID, masks, and vaccines; 
and 
 
4  Ryan Mac, Growth At Any Cost: Top Facebook Executive Defended Data Collection In 
2016 Memo — And Warned That Facebook Could Get People Killed, BUZZFEED 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/growth-at-any-cost-top-facebook-executive-
defended-data (emphasis added). 
5  In most companies, the total disregard shown for the human toll of corporate action 
would have been met with termination; here, however, Andrew Bosworth not only stayed 
employed, but was in fact placed in charge of (and became a chief spokesman for) arguably the 
company’s largest and most aggressive expansion ever: the “Metaverse.” See Kurt Wagner, 
Who’s Building Facebook’s Metaverse? Meet CTO Andrew Bosworth, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 
2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-27/facebook-fb-new-cto-andrew-
bosworth-is-the-man-building-the-metaverse. 
6  Clare Duffy, Facebook has known it has a human trafficking problem for years. It still 































   




• Disturbingly, whistleblower Frances Haugen shed light on 
Facebook’s knowledge that its websites, including both Facebook 
and Instagram, led to mental health and body-image issues, and in 
some cases, eating disorders and suicidal thoughts, in teens. Yet, 
Facebook’s own internal research also showed that the more that 
teenagers had these thoughts and emotions, the more they used the 
app. So, it did nothing to protect the millions of children viewing 
its content daily and maintained the status quo. 
16. The clear underlying message of the Bosworth memo above, as well as these 
examples, is one of sacrifice: that the victims of a terrorist attack can be sacrificed for 
Facebook’s growth; that an innocent child who takes her own life because she is bullied can be 
sacrificed for Facebook’s growth; that democracy can be sacrificed for Facebook’s growth; that 
the mental and physical health of children can be sacrificed for Facebook’s growth; that the 
prevention of a global pandemic can be scarified for Facebook’s growth; and, as will be fully 
described here, that an entire ethnic population can be sacrificed for Facebook’s relentless 
growth.  
17. Because Facebook’s algorithms recommend that susceptible users join extremist 
groups, where users are conditioned to post even more inflammatory and divisive content, it is 
naturally open to exploitation by autocratic politicians and regimes. By using large numbers of 
fake accounts (that Facebook not only fails to police but actually likes because they inflate the 
user data Facebook presents to the financial markets), these regimes can repeatedly post, like, 
share, and comment on content attacking ethnic minorities or political opponents. Because that 
content appears to generate high engagement, Facebook’s algorithms prioritize it in the News 
Feeds of real users.  
18. As such, Facebook’s arrival in Burma provided exactly what the military and its 
civilian terrorists were praying for. Beginning around 2011, Facebook arranged for tens of 
millions of Burmese to gain access to the Internet for the first time, exclusively through 
Facebook. This resulted in a “crisis of digital literacy,” leaving these new users blind to the 
prevalence of false information online. Facebook did nothing, however, to warn its Burmese 
users about the dangers of misinformation and fake accounts on its system or take any steps to 






























   




19. The brutal and repressive Myanmar military regime employed hundreds of 
people, some posing as celebrities, to operate fake Facebook accounts and to generate hateful 
and dehumanizing content about the Rohingya.  
20. Anti-Rohingya content thereafter proliferated throughout the Facebook product 
for years. Human rights and civil society groups have collected thousands of examples of 
Facebook posts likening the Rohingya to animals, calling for Rohingya to be killed, describing 
the Rohingya as foreign invaders, and falsely accusing Rohingya of heinous crimes. 
21. It was clearly foreseeable, and indeed known to Facebook, that, by prioritizing 
and rewarding users for posting dangerous and harmful content online—as well as by 
recommending extremist groups and allowing fake accounts created by autocrats to flourish on 
its system—Facebook would radicalize users in Burma, causing them to then support or engage 
in dangerous or harmful conduct in the offline world. 
22. Despite having been repeatedly alerted between 2013 and 2017 to the vast 
quantities of anti-Rohingya hate speech and misinformation on its system, and the violent 
manifestation of that content against the Rohingya people, Facebook barely reacted and devoted 
scant resources to addressing the issue. 
23. The resulting Facebook-fueled anti-Rohingya sentiment motivated and enabled 
the military government of Myanmar to engage in a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the 
Rohingya. To justify and strengthen its hold on power, the government cast, by and through 
Facebook, the Rohingya as foreign invaders from which the military was protecting the Burmese 
people. Widespread anger toward, and fear of, the Rohingya made it possible for the government 
to enhance its own popularity by persecuting the Rohingya. Meanwhile, few Burmese civilians 
objected to the attendant human rights abuses and eventual acts of genocide; indeed, as described 
herein, many civilians actively participated in atrocities committed against the Rohingya. 
24. With the way cleared by Facebook, the military’s campaign of ethnic cleansing 
culminated with “clearance operations” that began in August 2017. Security forces, accompanied 






























   




than ten thousand Rohingya men, women, and children died by shooting, stabbing, burning, or 
drowning. Thousands of others were tortured, maimed, and raped. Whole villages were burned to 
the ground. More than 700,000 Rohingya eventually fled to squalid, overcrowded refugee camps 
in Bangladesh. 
25.  Not until 2018—after the damage had been done—did Facebook executives, 
including CEO Mark Zuckerberg and COO Sheryl Sandberg, meekly admit that Facebook 
should and could have done more to prevent what the United Nations has called “genocide” and 
a “human rights catastrophe.” Facebook’s underwhelming response failed to capture even a 
scintilla of the gravity of what it had done and the role it played, stating “we weren’t doing 
enough to help prevent our platform from being used to foment division and incite offline 
violence. We agree that we can and should do more.”7  
26. The second part of its efforts to “do more” was to launch the virtual reality centric 
“Metaverse” to further force themselves into the lives of billions. As noted by prominent 
political commentor Dan Pfeiffer,  
Facebook is one of the least liked, least trusted companies on the 
planet. They are in the middle of a massive scandal about their 
involvement in genocide, human trafficking, and disinformation. 
And their next move is to say: “What if you could live inside 
Facebook?”8  
27. Still, years after their initial tepid admission of negligence, former Facebook 
employee and now prolific whistleblower, Frances Haugen, stated “[t]he company’s leadership 
knows how to make Facebook and Instagram safer but won’t make the necessary changes 
because they have put their astronomical profits before people.”9 Notably, in litigation pending 
 
7  Alex Warofka, An Independent Assessment of the Human Rights Impact of Facebook in 
Myanmar, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Nov. 5, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/11/myanmar-
hria/. 
8  See @DanPfeiffer, TWITTER (Oct. 28, 2021, 3:24 PM) 
https://twitter.com/danpfeiffer/status/1453819894487674899. 
9  Abram Brown, Facebook ‘Puts Astronomical Profits Over People,’ Whistle-Blower Tells 

































   




before the International Court of Justice stemming from the Rohingya genocide, Facebook is at 
this very moment taking aggressive measures to conceal evidence of its involvement.10  
28. Perhaps the most damning example of Facebook’s continued failure in Burma is 
the ongoing—to this day—misinformation campaign being carried out on Facebook within the 
country. As reported by Reuters on November 2, 2021, the Myanmar military has  
 
tasked thousands of soldiers with conducting what is widely referred to in the 
military as “information combat” … The mission of the social media drive, part of 
the military’s broader propaganda operations, is to spread the junta's view among 
the population, as well as to monitor dissenters and attack them online as traitors, 
… “Soldiers are asked to create several fake accounts and are given content 
segments and talking points that they have to post” … In over 100 cases, the 
messages or videos were duplicated across dozens of copycat accounts within 
minutes, as well as on online groups, purported fan channels for Myanmar 
celebrities and sports teams and purported news outlets … Posts often referred to 
people who opposed the junta as “enemies of the state” and “terrorists”, and 
variously said they wanted to destroy the army, the country and the Buddhist 
religion.11 
29. At the core of this Complaint is the realization that Facebook was willing to trade 
the lives of the Rohingya people for better market penetration in a small country in Southeast 
Asia. Successfully reaching the majority of Burmese people, and continuing to operate there 
now, has a negligible impact on Facebook’s overall valuation and bottom line. Without the 
 
In a glaring example of Facebook’s failure to learn from its deadly mistakes in Burma, 
Haugen has provided documents demonstrating that history is currently repeating itself in 
Ethiopia, where acts of ethnic violence are being carried out against the Tigrayan minority 
amidst a raging civil war, again with the help of a Facebook-fueled misinformation and hate-
speech campaign. See Facebook is under new scrutiny for it’s role in Ethiopia’s conflict, NPR 
(Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/10/11/1045084676/facebook-is-under-new-scrutiny-
for-its-role-in-ethiopias-conflict. See also Mark Scott, Facebook did little to moderate posts in 
the world’s most violent countries, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2021), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/10/25/facebook-moderate-posts-violent-countries-517050 
(“In many of the world’s most dangerous conflict zones, Facebook has repeatedly failed to 
protect its users, combat hate speech targeting minority groups and hire enough local staff to 
quell religious sectarianism”). 
10  Robert Burnson, Facebook’s Stance on Myanmar Genocide Records Assailed by Gambia, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 28. 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-28/facebook-s-
stance-on-myanmar-genocide-records-assailed-by-gambia. 
11  Fanny Potkin, Wa Lone, 'Information combat': Inside the fight for Myanmar’s soul, 































   




Burma market, Facebook would still be worth $1 trillion, Mark Zuckerberg would still be one of 
the top ten richest people in the world, and its stock price would still be at astronomical levels.  
30. In the end, there was so little for Facebook to gain from its continued presence in 
Burma, and the consequences for the Rohingya people could not have been more dire. Yet, in the 
face of this knowledge, and possessing the tools to stop it, it simply kept marching forward.12 
That is because, once Facebook struck the Faustian Bargain that launched the company, it has 
had blinders on to any real calculation of the benefits to itself compared to the negative impacts 
it has on anyone else. Facebook is like a robot programed with a singular mission: to grow. And 
the undeniable reality is that Facebook’s growth, fueled by hate, division, and misinformation, 
has left hundreds of thousands of devastated Rohingya lives in its wake.  
PARTIES 
31. Plaintiff Jane Doe is a natural person and a Rohingya Muslim refugee. Plaintiff 
resides in Illinois. 
32. Meta Platforms, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Delaware, with its principal place of business at 1 Hacker Way, Menlo Park, California 
94025. Until October 2021, Defendant Meta was known as Facebook, Inc. Meta Platforms does 
business in this County, the State of California, and across the United States. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
33. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Article VI, Section 10, of 
the California Constitution and Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10. 
 
12  Angshuman Choudhury, How Facebook Is Complicit in Myanmar’s Attacks on 
Minorities, THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.thediplomat.com/2020/08/how-
facebook-is-complicit-in-myanmars-attacks-on-minorities/ (“why would Facebook favor the 
regime in Myanmar? For the same reason it would do so in India: to protect business interests in 
a domestic market that it currently dominates by a wide margin. Imposing bans on government- 
or military-linked accounts could dilute this monopoly by drawing the ire of state regulators.”) In 
2020, Facebook similarly bowed to the demands of the Communist Vietnamese government to 
“censor posts with anti-state language rather than risk losing an estimated $1 billion in annual 
revenue from the country.” Peter Wade, Facebook Bowed to Vietnam Government’s Censorship 































   




34. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because its principal place of 
business is located within this County. Plaintiff submits to the jurisdiction of the Court. 
35. Venue is proper in this Court under Cal. Code Civ. P. § 395(a) because Defendant 
resides in this County. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
I. The Defective Design of Facebook’s Algorithms and Services 
A. Facebook Designed Its Social Network to Maximize Engagement 
36. Facebook’s goal is to maximize “engagement,” a metric reflecting the amount of 
time a user spends and the amount of interaction (“likes,” “shares,” comments, etc.) that the user 
has with any given content. For Facebook, engagement determines advertising revenue, which 
determines profits. “The prime directive of engagement … is driven by monetization. It befits a 
corporation aiming to accelerate growth, stimulate ad revenue, and generate profits for its 
shareholders.”13 
37. In its SEC Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2012, Facebook warned:  
 
if our users decrease their level of engagement with Facebook, our 
revenue, financial results, and business may be significantly 
harmed. The size of our user base and our users’ level of 
engagement are critical to our success…. [O]ur business 
performance will become increasingly dependent on our ability to 
increase levels of user engagement and monetization…. Any 
decrease in user retention, growth, or engagement could render 
Facebook less attractive to developers and marketers, which may 
have a material and adverse impact on our revenue, business, 
financial condition, and results of operations. … Our advertising 
revenue could be adversely affected by a number of … factors, 
including: decreases in user engagement, including time spent on 
Facebook[.]14 
38. Accordingly, Facebook intentionally incorporated engagement-based ranking of 
content into its system and the algorithms that drive it. Facebook’s News Feed—the first thing 
 
13  Luke Munn, Angry by design: toxic communication and technical architectures, 
HUMANIT SOC SCI COMMUN 7 (July 30, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-020-
00550-7. 
14  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K, Facebook, Inc. (fiscal year ended 
































   




that users see when opening up the app or entering the site and “the center of the Facebook 
experience”—is driven by engagement. Posts with higher engagement scores are included and 
prioritized in the News Feed, while posts with lower scores are buried or excluded altogether. 
“[T]he Feed’s … logics can be understood through a design decision to elevate and amplify 
‘engaging’ content…. [T]he core logic of engagement remains baked into the design of the Feed 
at a deep level.”15 
39. Facebook engineers and data scientists meet regularly to assess the billions of 
likes, comments and clicks Facebook users make every day to “divine ways to make us like, 
comment and click more,” so that users will keep coming back and seeing more ads from the 
company’s 2 million advertisers. Engineers are continually running experiments with a small 
share of Facebook users to boost engagement. 16 Thus, Facebook’s design was the “result of 
particular decisions made over time…. Every area has undergone meticulous scrutiny … by 
teams of developers and designers…. [Facebook] has evolved through conscious decisions in 
response to a particular set of priorities.”17 
40. Facebook has consistently promoted and rewarded employees who contribute to 
the company’s growth through a relentless focus on increased engagement of Facebook users; 
employees who raise ethical and safety concerns tend to be ignored and marginalized and, 
eventually, left the company.18 
 
15  Luke Munn, Angry by design: toxic communication and technical architectures, 
HUMANIT SOC SCI COMMUN 7 (July 30, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-020-
00550-7. 
16  Victor Luckerson, Here’s How Facebook’s News Feed Actually Works, TIME (July 9, 
2015), https://time.com/collection-post/3950525/facebook-news-feed-algorithm/. 
17  Luke Munn, Angry by design: toxic communication and technical architectures, 
HUMANIT SOC SCI COMMUN 7 (July 30, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-020-
00550-7. 
18  Katie Canales, ‘Increasingly gaslit’: See the messages concerned Facebook employees 
wrote as they left the company, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 28, 2021), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-papers-employee-departure-badge-post-gaslit-
burned-out-2021-10 (“[t]he employee said Facebook's infamous growth-first approach leads to 
rolling out ‘risky features.’ If employees propose reversing that risk, they’re seen as being 
‘growth-negative, and veto’d by decision makers on those grounds,’ they said. They also said it’s 






























   







B. Facebook Prioritizes Hate Speech and Misinformation to Increase 
User Engagement  
41. Facebook knows that the most negative emotions—fear, anger, hate—are the 
most engaging. Facebook employs psychologists and social scientists as “user researchers” to 
analyze its user’s behavior in response to online content. An internal Facebook presentation by 
one such researcher, leaked in May 2020, warned: “Our algorithms exploit the human brain’s 
attraction to divisiveness…. If left unchecked, … [Facebook would feed users] more and more 
divisive content in an effort to gain user attention & increase time on the platform.”19  
42. To maximize engagement, Facebook does not merely fill users’ News Feeds with 
disproportionate amounts of hate speech and misinformation; it employs a system of social 
rewards that manipulates and trains users to create such content. When users post content, other 
users who are shown that content are prompted to “like,” “comment” on, or “share” it. Under 
each piece of content, users can see how many times others have liked or shared that content and 





43. A study published in February 2021 confirmed that, “[i]n online social media 
platforms, feedback on one’s behavior often comes in the form of a ‘like’—a signal of approval 
 
19  Jeff Horwitz, Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Executives Shut Down Efforts to Make the 
































   




from another user regarding one’s post” and tested the assumption that likes “function as a social 
reward.”20 
44. Roger McNamee, an early investor in Facebook and advisor to Mark Zuckerberg, 
wrote in his New York Times bestseller, “Zucked: Waking Up to the Facebook Catastrophe”: 
Getting a user outraged, anxious, or afraid is a powerful way to 
increase engagement. Anxious and fearful users check the site 
more frequently. Outraged users share more content to let other 
people know what they should also be outraged about. Best of all 
from Facebook’s perspective, outraged or fearful users in an 
emotionally hijacked state become more reactive to further 
emotionally charged content. It is easy to imagine how 
inflammatory content would accelerate the heart rate and trigger 
dopamine hits.21 
45. A Nature article published in 2020 further explained: 
[I]ncendiary, polarizing posts consistently achieve high 
engagement…. This content is meant to draw engagement, to 
provide a reaction…. 
This divisive material often has a strong moral charge. It takes a 
controversial topic and establishes two sharply opposed camps, 
championing one group while condemning the other. These are the 
headlines and imagery that leap out at a user as they scroll past, 
forcing them to come to a halt. This offensive material hits a nerve, 
inducing a feeling of disgust or outrage. “Emotional reactions like 
outrage are strong indicators of engagement…. [T]his kind of 
divisive content will be shown first, because it captures more 
attention than other types of content.” … 
The design of Facebook means that … forwarding and 
redistribution is only a few clicks away…. Moreover, the 
networked nature of social media amplifies this single response, 
distributing it to hundreds of friends and acquaintances. They too 
receive this incendiary content and they too share, inducing … 
“outrage cascades — viral explosions of moral judgment and 
disgust.” Outrage does not just remain constrained to a single user, 
 
20  Björn Lindström, Martin Bellander, David T. Schultner, Allen Chang, Philippe N. Tobler, 
David M. Amodio, A computational reward learning account of social media engagement, 



































   




but proliferates, spilling out to provoke other users and appear in 
other online environments.22 
46. Facebook knew that it could increase engagement and the length of time users 
spend on its websites (and subsequently increase its revenue) by adjusting its algorithms to 
manipulate users’ News Feeds and showing them more negative content thus causing “massive-
scale emotional contagion.” In 2014, Adam Kramer, a member of Facebook’s “Core Data 
Science Team,” co-authored an article describing one of the experiments that Facebook 
conducted on its own users, stating, 
we test whether emotional contagion occurs outside of in-person 
interaction between individuals by reducing the amount of 
emotional content in the News Feed … Which content is shown or 
omitted in the News Feed is determined via a ranking algorithm 
that Facebook continually develops and tests in the interest of 
showing viewers the content they will find most relevant and 
engaging. One such test is reported in this study: A test of whether 
posts with emotional content are more engaging. 
 
* * * 
The results show emotional contagion…. [F]or people who had 
positive content reduced in their News Feed, a larger percentage of 
words in people’s status updates were negative and a smaller 
percentage were positive ... 
These results indicate that emotions expressed by others on 
Facebook influence our own emotions, constituting experimental 
evidence for massive-scale contagion via social networks.23 
 
47. Independent research unequivocally confirms that fake content thrives on 
Facebook over more reliable and trustworthy sources. In September 2021, the Washington Post 
reported on a “forthcoming peer-reviewed study by researchers at New York University and the 
Université Grenoble Alpes in France [which] found that from August 2020 to January 2021, 
news publishers known for putting out misinformation got six times the amount of likes, shares, 
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and interactions on the [Facebook] platform as did trustworthy news sources, such as CNN or the 
World Health Organization.”24 
48. In testimony before Congress in September 2020, Tim Kendall, Facebook’s first 
Director of Monetization—likening Facebook’s business model to that of Big Tobacco—
explained how such content makes Facebook addictive: 
At Facebook, I believe we sought to mine as much human attention 
as possible and turn it into historically unprecedented profits. To 
do this, we didn’t simply create something useful and fun; we took 
a page from Big Tobacco’s playbook, working to make our 
offering addictive at the outset….  
The next page in Big Tobacco’s playbook was to add 
bronchodilators to cigarettes. This allowed the smoke to get in 
contact with more surface area of the lungs. Allowing for 
misinformation, conspiracy theories, and fake news to flourish 
were Facebook’s bronchodilators. 
But that incendiary content wasn’t enough. Tobacco companies 
then added ammonia to cigarettes to increase the speed with which 
nicotine traveled to the brain. Facebook’s ability to deliver this 
incendiary content to the right person, at the right time, in the exact 
right way—through their algorithms—that is their ammonia. And 
we now know it fosters tribalism and division.  
Social media preys on the most primal parts of your brain; it 
provokes, it shocks, and it enrages…. 
Facebook and their cohorts worship at the altar of engagement and 
cast other concerns aside, raising the voices of division, anger, 
hate, and misinformation to drown out the voices of truth, justice, 
morality, and peace.25 
49. Content attacking opposing groups is particularly engaging. Zeynep Tufekci, a 
sociologist at University of North Carolina, has written that: 
the new, algorithmic gatekeepers aren’t merely (as they like to 
believe) neutral conduits for both truth and falsehood. They make 
their money by keeping people on their sites and apps; that aligns 
their incentives closely with those who stoke outrage, spread 
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misinformation, and appeal to people’s existing biases and 
preferences. 
[T]he problem is that when we encounter opposing views in the 
age and context of social media, it’s not like reading them in a 
newspaper while sitting alone. It’s like hearing them from the 
opposing team while sitting with our fellow fans in a football 
stadium. Online, we’re connected with our communities, and we 
seek approval from our like-minded peers. We bond with our team 
by yelling at the fans of the other one. In sociology terms, we 
strengthen our feeling of “in-group” belonging by increasing our 
distance from and tension with the “out-group”—us versus 
them…. This is why the various projects for fact-checking claims 
in the news, while valuable, don’t convince people. Belonging is 
stronger than facts.26 
50. A study published in June 2021 showed that posts attacking “others” (the “out-
group”) are particularly effective at generating social rewards, such as likes, shares, and 
comments, and that those reactions consist largely of expressions of anger: 
We investigated whether out-group animosity was particularly 
successful at generating engagement on two of the largest social 
media platforms: Facebook and Twitter. Analyzing posts from 
news media accounts and US congressional members (n = 
2,730,215), we found that posts about the political out-group were 
shared or retweeted about twice as often as posts about the in-
group.… Out-group language consistently emerged as the strongest 
predictor of shares and retweets…. Language about the out-group 
was a very strong predictor of “angry” reactions (the most popular 
reactions across all datasets)…. In sum, out-group language is the 
strongest predictor of social media engagement across all relevant 
predictors measured, suggesting that social media may be creating 
perverse incentives for content expressing out-group animosity.27 
51. Another study, published in August 2021, analyzed how “quantifiable social 
feedback (in the form of ‘likes’ and ‘shares’)” affected the amount of “moral outrage” expressed 
in subsequent posts. The authors “found that daily outrage expression was significantly and 
positively associated with the amount of social feedback received for the previous day’s outrage 
expression.” The amount of social feedback is, in turn, determined by the algorithms underlying 
the social media product: 
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Social media newsfeed algorithms can directly affect how much 
social feedback a given post receives by determining how many 
other users are exposed to that post. Because we show here that 
social feedback affects users’ outrage expressions over time, this 
suggests that newsfeed algorithms can influence users’ moral 
behaviors by exploiting their natural tendencies for reinforcement 
learning…. [D]esign choices aimed at … profit maximization via 
user engagement can indirectly affect moral behavior because 
outrage-provoking content draws high engagement….28 
52. In other words, if a user makes two posts—one containing hateful, outraged, and 
divisive content and one lacking such content—Facebook’s algorithms will show the hateful, 
outraged, and divisive post to more users. Consequently, the hateful, outraged, and divisive post 
is rewarded with more likes, shares, and comments. The user quickly learns that to obtain a 
reaction to his or her posts, he or she should incorporate as much hateful, outraged, and divisive 
content as possible.  
53. On October 5, 2021, Frances Haugen, a former Facebook product manager, 
testified before Congress: 
The dangers of engagement based ranking are that Facebook 
knows that content that elicits an extreme reaction from you is 
more likely to get a click, a comment or reshare. And it’s 
interesting because those clicks and comments and reshares aren’t 
even necessarily for your benefit, it’s because they know that other 
people will produce more content if they get the likes and 
comments and reshares. They prioritize content in your feed so that 
you will give little hits of dopamine to your friends, so they will 
create more content. And they have run experiments on people, 
producer side experiments, where they have confirmed this.29  
 
54. Recently leaked documents confirm Facebook’s ability to determine the type of 
content users post through its algorithms. After Facebook modified its algorithms in 2018 to 
boost engagement, “[t]he most divisive content that publishers produced was going viral on the 
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platform … creating an incentive to produce more of it…. Company researchers discovered that 
publishers and political parties were reorienting their posts toward outrage and sensationalism. 
That tactic produced high levels of comments and reactions that translated into success on 
Facebook.” Facebook researchers further discovered that “the new algorithm’s heavy weighting 
of reshared material in its News Feed made the angry voices louder. ‘Misinformation, toxicity, 
and violent content are inordinately prevalent among reshares,’ researchers noted in internal 
memos.” Facebook data scientists suggested “a number of potential changes to curb the tendency 
of the overhauled algorithm to reward outrage and lies” but “Mr. Zuckerberg resisted some of the 
proposed fixes, the documents show, because he was worried they might hurt the company’s 
other objective—making users engage more with Facebook.”30 
55. In October 2021, NBC News described, based on internal documents leaked by 
Frances Haugen, an experiment in which an account created by Facebook researchers 
experienced “a barrage of extreme, conspiratorial, and graphic content”—even though the 
fictitious user had never expressed interest in such content. For years, Facebook “researchers had 
been running [similar] experiments … to gauge the platform’s hand in radicalizing users, 
according to the documents seen by NBC News,” and among Haugen’s disclosures are 
“research, reports and internal posts that suggest Facebook has long known its algorithms and 
recommendation systems push some users to extremes.”31 
56. It is not surprising that the true nature of Facebook’s algorithms has become fully 
apparent only through leaked documents and whistleblower testimony, since Facebook goes to 
great lengths to hinder outside academic research regarding the design of those algorithms. In a 
congressional hearing entitled “The Disinformation Black Box: Researching Social Media Data” 
 
30  Keach Hagey, Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Tried to Make Its Platform a Healthier Place. It 
Got Angrier Instead, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 15, 2021), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-algorithm-change-zuckerberg-11631654215. 
31  Brandy Zadrozny, “Carol’s Journey”: What Facebook knew about how it radicalizes 































   




on September 28, 2021, three social media researchers testified about Facebook’s attempts to 
block their access to the data they needed: 
• Laura Edelson of New York University testified: “this summer, 
Facebook cut off my team’s access to their data. We used that very 
data to support the finding in our recent study that posts from 
misinformation sources on Facebook got six times more 
engagement than factual news during the 2020 elections, to 
identify multiple security and privacy vulnerabilities that we have 
reported to Facebook, and to audit Facebook’s own, public-facing 
Ad Library for political ads.”32 
• Alan Mislove, a Professor of Computer Sciences at Northeastern 
University, testified: “Facebook recently criticized a study on 
misinformation by saying it focused on who engages with content 
and not who sees it—but that’s only true because Facebook does 
not make such impression data available to researchers.”33 
• Kevin T. Leicht, a Professor of Sociology at University of Illinois 
Urbana-Champaign testified: “there are limited amounts of social 
media data available due to company restrictions placed on that 
data. Many researchers fear litigation that may result from 
analyzing and publishing results from these data.”34 
57. On October 5, 2021, Haugen testified before Congress: 
[N]o one truly understands the destructive choices made by 
Facebook except Facebook…. 
A company with such frightening influence over so many people, 
over their deepest thoughts, feelings, and behavior, needs real 
oversight. But Facebook’s closed design means it has no real 
oversight. Only Facebook knows how it personalizes your Feed for 
you. 
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At other large tech companies like Google, any independent 
researcher can download from the Internet the company’s search 
results and write papers about what they find. And they do. But 
Facebook hides behind walls that keeps researchers and regulators 
from understanding the true dynamics of their system….35 
58. Nevertheless, it is now clear that, by modifying the design of its algorithms and 
system, Facebook can influence and manipulate the quantity, substance, and emotional tone of 
the content its users produce. Through its dopamine-based incentive structure of social rewards 
and cues, as well as its algorithmic promotion of hate speech and misinformation, Facebook 
contributes to and participates in the development and creation of outraged, extreme, and 
divisive content. 
59. It’s obviously not in Facebook’s favor—especially its bottom line—to curb the 
spread of negative content and adjust its algorithm to promote positive content. One designer and 
technologist proposed four different interventions to address the “problems of polarization, 
dehumanization, and outrage, three of the most dangerous byproducts” of tools such as 
Facebook. The four interventions described in the article include “Give Humanizing Prompts,” 
“Picking out unhealthy content with better metrics,” “Filter unhealthy content by default,” and 
“Give users feed control.” Facebook had not implemented any such interventions, undoubtedly 
because, as the author admitted, the interventions “will all likely result in short-term reductions 
in engagement and ad revenue.”36 
60. Facebook has options for moderating its algorithms’ tendency to promote hate 
speech and misinformation, but it rejects those options because the production of more engaging 
content takes precedence. In a September 2021 article, based on recently leaked internal 
documents, the Wall Street Journal described how Facebook had modified its News Feed 
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algorithm “to reverse [a] decline in comments, and other forms of engagement, and to encourage 
more original posting” by users.37  
61. Simply put, it is clear—based largely on admissions from former Facebook 
executives—that Facebook’s algorithms are not “neutral.” The algorithms do not merely 
recommend content based on users’ previously expressed interests; rather, to maximize 
engagement, they are heavily biased toward promoting content that will enrage, polarize, and 
radicalize users. Facebook does not simply “connect” people with similar interests; it exploits the 
universal human instinct for tribalism by actively herding people into groups that define 
themselves through their violent opposition to “other” people—often identified by race, religion, 
or political ideology. 
C. Facebook Curates and Promotes Extremist Group Content 
62. Facebook’s algorithms curate and promote content that attracts new members to 
extremist groups. A presentation by a researcher employed at Facebook, which was leaked in 
2020, showed that Facebook’s algorithms were responsible for the growth of German extremist 
groups on the website: “The 2016 presentation states that ‘64% of all extremist group joins are 
due to our recommendation tools’ and that most of the activity came from the platform’s ‘Groups 
You Should Join’ and ‘Discover’ algorithms. ‘Our recommendation systems grow the problem.’” 
Ultimately, however, because “combating polarization might come at the cost of lower 
engagement … Mr. Zuckerberg and other senior executives largely shelved the basic research … 
and weakened or blocked efforts to apply its conclusions to Facebook products.”38 
63. Roger McNamee gave this example: 
[I]f I am active in a Facebook Group associated with a conspiracy 
theory and then stop using the platform for a time, Facebook will 
do something surprising when I return. It may suggest other 
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conspiracy theory Groups to join…. And because conspiracy 
theory Groups are highly engaging, they are very likely to 
encourage reengagement with the platform. If you join the Group, 
the choice appears to be yours, but the reality is that Facebook 
planted the seed. It does so not because conspiracy theories are 
good for you but because conspiracy theories are good for them.39 
McNamee described how, in 2016, he had raised his concerns with Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl 
Sandberg, to no avail.40 
64. In the August 2021 study discussed above, the authors stated: “[U]sers conform to 
the expressive norms of their social network, expressing more outrage when they are embedded 
in ideologically extreme networks where outrage expressions are more widespread…. Such norm 
learning processes, combined with social reinforcement learning, might encourage more 
moderate users to become less moderate over time, as they are repeatedly reinforced by their 
peers for expressing outrage.”41  
65. Indeed, the positive feedback loop created by Facebook in the form of “likes,” 
“comments,” and “shares” drive user engagement with extremist content and reward user 
participation in creating such content. Together with algorithms promoting hate speech, 
misinformation, and conspiracy theories, Facebook has steered users to extremist groups and 
trained those users to express more outrage. 
D. Exploitation by Autocrats 
66. Facebook’s system and algorithms are also susceptible to exploitation by 
unscrupulous and autocratic politicians and regimes. In his book, McNamee wrote: 
Facebook’s culture, design goals, and business priorities made the 
platform an easy target for bad actors, which Facebook aggravated 
with algorithms and moderation policies that amplified extreme 
voices. The architecture and business model that make Facebook 
successful also make it dangerous. Economics drive the company 
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to align—often unconsciously—with extremists and authoritarians 
to the detriment of democracy around the world.42 
67. Facebook had the ability to detect and deactivate counterfeit accounts used by 
authoritarian politicians and regimes to generate “fake engagement” but devoted minimal 
resources to that task. In April 2021, Sophie Zhang, a data scientist whom Facebook had fired a 
year earlier, spoke out about having “found multiple blatant attempts by foreign national 
governments to abuse our platform on vast scales to mislead their own citizenry….” For 
example, “[o]ver one six-week period from June to July 2018, [the president of Honduras]’s 
Facebook posts received likes from 59,100 users, more than 78% of which were not real people.” 
Such “fake engagement can influence how that content performs in the all-important news feed 
algorithm; it is a kind of counterfeit currency in Facebook’s attention marketplace.”43  
68. It took Facebook almost a year to remove fake accounts associated with 
“domestic-focused coordinated inauthentic activity in Honduras” and, when Zhang “found that 
the Honduras network was reconstituting … there was little appetite from [Facebook] to take it 
down again.” Before she was fired, Zhang alerted Facebook to networks of fake Pages 
supporting political leaders in Albania, Azerbaijan, Mexico, Argentina, Italy, the Philippines, 
Afghanistan, South Korea, Bolivia, Ecuador, Iraq, Tunisia, Turkey, Taiwan, Paraguay, El 
Salvador, India, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Ukraine, Poland, and Mongolia. Some of 
these networks were investigated while others “languish[ed] for months without action.”44 
69. Zhang gave one example that was especially reminiscent of the situation in 
Burma: 
Of all the cases of inauthentic behavior that Zhang uncovered, the 
one that most concerned her—and that took the longest to take 
down—was in Azerbaijan. It was one of the largest she had seen, 
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and it was clearly being used to prop up an authoritarian regime 
with an egregious record on human rights. 
The Azerbaijani network used the same tactic that was seen in 
Honduras—thousands of Facebook Pages set up to look like user 
accounts—but instead of creating fake likes, the Pages were used 
to harass. Over one 90-day period in 2019, it produced 
approximately 2.1m negative, harassing comments on the 
Facebook Pages of opposition leaders and independent media 
outlets, accusing them of being traitors and praising the country’s 
autocratic leader, President Ilham Aliyev, and his ruling party, the 
YAP. 
Facebook did not employ a dedicated policy staffer or market 
specialist for Azerbaijan, and neither its eastern European nor 
Middle Eastern policy teams took responsibility for it. Eventually 
Zhang discovered that the Turkey policy team was supposed to 
cover the former Soviet republic, but none of them spoke Azeri or 
had expertise in the country. As of August 2020, Facebook did not 
have any full-time or contract operations employees who were 
known to speak Azeri, leaving staff to use Google Translate to try 
to understand the nature of the abuse. 
Facebook did not take down those fake accounts or Pages until more than a year after Zhang 
reported them.45 
E. Facebook’s Algorithm Has Successfully Radicalized Its Users 
70. By prioritizing hate speech and misinformation in users’ News Feeds, training 
users to produce ever more extreme and outraged content, recommending extremist groups, and 
allowing its product to be exploited by autocrats, Facebook radicalizes users and incites them to 
violence. 
71. As Chamath Palihapitiya, Facebook’s former vice president for user growth, told 
an audience at Stanford Business School: “I think we have created tools that are ripping apart the 
social fabric of how society works … [t]he short-term, dopamine-driven feedback loops we’ve 
created are destroying how society works … No civil discourse, no cooperation[,] 
misinformation, mistruth. And it’s not an American problem…”46 
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72. McNamee likewise explained how the design of Facebook’s algorithms and 
system lead to real-world violence: “The design of Facebook trained users to unlock their 
emotions, to react without critical thought…. at Facebook’s scale it enables emotional contagion, 
where emotions overwhelm reason…. Left unchecked, hate speech leads to violence, 
disinformation undermines democracy.”47 
73. As Dipayan Ghosh, a former Facebook privacy expert, noted, “[w]e have set 
ethical red lines in society, but when you have a machine that prioritizes engagement, it will 
always be incentivized to cross those lines.”48 
74. Facebook’s tendency to cause real-world violence by radicalizing users online has 
been demonstrated time and time again. A few recent examples include: 
• In March 2019, a gunman killed 51 people at two mosques in 
Christchurch, New Zealand, while live-streaming the event on 
Facebook.49 For two years prior to the shooting, the gunman had 
been active on the Facebook group of the Lads Society, an 
Australian extremist white nationalist group.50 
• In August 2020, “[h]ours before a 17-year-old white man allegedly 
killed two people and injured a third at protests over a police 
shooting in Kenosha, Wisconsin, a local militia group posted a call 
on Facebook: ‘Any patriots willing to take up arms and defend our 
city tonight from evil thugs?’”51 Later, Mark Zuckerberg said that 
“the social media giant made a mistake by not removing a page 
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and event that urged people in Kenosha … to carry weapons amid 
protests.”52 
• “In the days leading up to [the January 6, 2021] march on the 
Capitol, supporters of President Trump promoted it extensively on 
Facebook and Facebook-owned Instagram and used the services to 
organize bus trips to Washington. More than 100,000 users posted 
hashtags affiliated with the movement prompted by baseless claims 
of election fraud, including #StopTheSteal and 
#FightForTrump.”53 
75. Prior to Facebook’s entry into Burma, as described below, Facebook was on 
notice of the manner in which its service could influence political conflict and be used to fuel 
real-world violence. For example, during a 2010 conflict in Kyrgyzstan, highly divisive and at 
times violent content spread widely on Facebook, inclusive of substantial misinformation related 
to the source and cause for ongoing violence.54 Likewise, even in examples where Facebook has 
been credited with supporting protests for positive political change before 2012, the consistent 
result is that the same governments and militant groups that were opposed by the protests, 
eventually utilized Facebook to help put down those uprisings through widespread 
misinformation campaigns.55  
76. Facebook was on notice very early on in its existence that “that liberty isn't the 
only end toward which these tools can be turned.”56 And it is with that knowledge in hand that it 
launched in the extremely volatile environment present in Burma.  
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II. The Introduction of Facebook Led to a Crisis of Digital Literacy in Burma  
77. In addition to high engagement, continued user growth was critical to Facebook’s 
success. “If we fail to retain existing users or add new users, … our revenue, financial results, 
and business may be significantly harmed.”57 By 2012, Facebook reported 1.06 billion monthly 
active users (“MAUs”) with 84% of those accessing Facebook from outside the United States, 
meaning that there were already about 170 million MAUs in the United States—equal to more 
than half the U.S. population.58 To ensure continued growth, Facebook would have to gain users 
in developing countries, many of whom had no previous access to the Internet. 
78. Prior to 2011, in an atmosphere of extreme censorship, only about 1% of the 
Burmese population had cell phones. That percentage grew dramatically with the liberalization 
that began in 2011.59 In 2013, when two foreign telecom companies were permitted to enter the 
market, the cost of a SIM card fell from more than $200 to as little as $2, and by 2016, nearly 
half the population had mobile phone subscriptions, most with Internet access.60 
79. Facebook took active steps to ensure that it would have a dominant position in the 
emerging Burmese market. “Entering the country in 2010, Facebook initially allowed its app to 
be used without incurring data charges, so it gained rapid popularity. It would come pre-loaded 
on phones bought at mobile shops….”61  
80. Facebook would eventually pursue a similar strategy for penetrating other 
developing markets, as reflected in its “Free Basics” product. Free Basics was “a Facebook-
 
57  Facebook 2012 10-K, at 13, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680113000003/fb-
12312012x10k.htm#s5D6A63A4BB6B6A7AD01CD7A5A25638E4. 
58  Id. at 8. 
59  Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
Myanmar, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1643079/files/A_HRC_39_CRP-2-EN.pdf (“UNHRC 
Report”) ¶ 1343. 
60  Steve Stecklow, Why Facebook is losing the war on hate speech in Myanmar, REUTERS 
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developed mobile app that gives users access to a small selection of data-light websites and 
services … [t]o deliver the service, … Facebook partners with local mobile operators … [who] 
agree to ‘zero-rate’ the data consumed by the app, making it free, while Facebook does the 
technical heavy lifting to ensure that they can do this as cheaply as possible. Each version is 
localized, offering a slightly different set of up to 150 sites and services…. There are no other 
social networking sites apart from Facebook and no email provider.”62 
81. One reason why Facebook gained immense traction in Burma is that “[t]he 
website … handles Myanmar fonts well compared to other social media like Twitter.”63 After 
citizens bought an inexpensive phone and a cheap SIM card, “there was one app that everybody 
in [Burma] wanted: Facebook. The reason? Google and some of the other big online portals 
didn’t support Burmese text, but Facebook did.”64 
82. For the majority of Burma’s 20 million Internet-connected citizen’s, “Facebook is 
the internet…. [M]ost mobile phones sold in the country come preloaded with Facebook…. 
There are equal numbers of internet users and Facebook users in [Burma]. As a result, many 
people use Facebook as their main source of information….”65  
83. A report commissioned by Facebook in 2018 described how the rapid transition of 
Burma from a society without modern communications infrastructure to an Internet-connected 
society caused “a crisis of digital literacy: A large population of internet users lacks basic 
understanding of how to … make judgments on online content.… Digital literacy is generally 
low across the country, and many people find it difficult to verify or differentiate content (for 
 
62  Olivia Solon, ‘It’s digital colonialism’: how Facebook’s free internet service has failed 
its users, THE GUARDIAN (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/27/facebook-free-basics-developing-markets. 
63  Hereward Holland, Facebook in Myanmar: Amplifying Hate Speech?, AL JAZEERA 
(Jun. 14, 2014), https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/6/14/facebook-in-myanmar-
amplifying-hate-speech. 
64  Anisa Sudebar, The country where Facebook posts whipped up hate, BBC TRENDING 
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-45449938. 
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example, real news from misinformation).”66 As noted by Sarah Su, a Facebook employee who 
works on content safety issues on the News Feed, “[w]hat you’ve seen in the past five years is 
almost an entire country getting online at the same time, we realized that digital literacy is quite 
low. They don’t have the antibodies to [fight] viral misinformation.”67 
84. The U.N. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (the 
“U.N. Mission”) investigating the genocide in Burma reported: “[t]he Myanmar context is 
distinctive … because of the relatively new exposure of the Myanmar population to the Internet 
and social media…. In a context of low digital and social media literacy, the Government’s use 
of Facebook for official announcements and sharing of information further contributes to users’ 
perception of Facebook as a reliable source of information.”68 
85. Thet Swei Win, the director of an organization that works to promote social 
harmony between ethnic groups in Burma, told the BBC “[w]e have no internet literacy…[w]e 
have no proper education on how to use the internet, how to filter the news, how to use the 
internet effectively.”69 
86. As described by the U.N., “[t]he relative unfamiliarity of the population with the 
Internet and with digital platforms and the easier and cheaper access to Facebook have led to a 
situation in [Burma] where Facebook is the Internet…. For many people, Facebook is the main, 
if not only, platform for online news and for using the Internet more broadly.”70 “Facebook is 
arguably the only source of information online for the majority in [Burma]”71 and “Facebook is a 
 
66  Id. 
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68  UNHRC Report, ¶¶ 1342, 1345, 
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69  Anisa Sudebar, The country where Facebook posts whipped up hate, BBC TRENDING 
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-45449938. 
70  UNHRC Report, ¶ 1345, 
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particularly influential medium in Myanmar. More than 14 million people out [of] a total 
population of 53 million utilize Facebook in Myanmar, and according to a 2016 survey of 
internet users in Myanmar, ‘reading news on the internet’ often meant ‘news they had seen on 
their Facebook newsfeed, and [they] did not seem aware of other news sources online.’”72 
87. The New York Times has reported that “[t]he military exploited Facebook’s wide 
reach in Myanmar, where it is so broadly used that many of the country’s 18 million internet 
users confuse the Silicon Valley social media platform with the internet,”73 and that “[a]s 
Facebook’s presence in Myanmar grew …, the company did not address what the BSR report 
calls ‘a crisis of digital literacy’ in a country that was just emerging from a military dictatorship 
and where the internet was still new.”74 
88. In the end, the U.N. put it best: “Facebook has been a useful instrument for those 
seeking to spread hate, in a context where, for most users, Facebook is the Internet.”75 
 
III. Facebook Amplified the Myanmar Military’s Use of Fear and Hatred of the 
Rohingya to Justify its Hold on Power 
89. By 2011, the country’s history of political repression and ethnic violence was 
widely known. “Myanmar’s political history has been heavily dominated by an all-powerful 
military, known as the Myanmar ‘Tatmadaw,’ which has ruled the country for most of its 
 
72  Fortify Rights, They Gave Them Long Swords: Preparations for Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity Against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, Myanmar at 95, n.403 (July 
2018), https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Fortify_Rights_Long_Swords_July_2018.pdf 
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(Feb. 2016), https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
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existence.”76 In 1962, the military took power in a coup led by General Ne Win.77 In 1989, after 
widespread protests against the regime had broken out the year before, the military placed Aung 
San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy opposition party (NLD) and winner 
of the Nobel peace prize, under house arrest; after the NLD won a general election in 1990, the 
military government refused to recognize the result or to allow the legislature to assemble.78 
“During the military dictatorship [from 1962 to 2011], Myanmar was considered one of the most 
repressive countries in Asia.”79 
90. Despite a brief period of liberalization that began in 2011, the military continued 
to dominate Burma’s government. The 2008 Constitution was designed by “the military to retain 
its dominant role in politics and government … 25 percent of the seats in each house of 
parliament and in the state and regional assemblies belong to unelected members of the military, 
who are appointed by the Tatmadaw.”80 In addition to being guaranteed at least one vice 
presidential position, “the Tatmadaw selects candidates for (and effectively controls) three key 
ministerial posts: Defence, Border Affairs and Home Affairs. This is sufficient to control the 
National Defence and Security Council and the entire security apparatus.”81 
91. The military has consistently used an imagined threat from the Rohingya to justify 
its hold on power. “[T]he ‘Rohingya crisis’ in Rakhine State … has been used by the military to 
reaffirm itself as the protector of a nation under threat….”82 In support of the 1962 coup, 
“General Ne Win argued that a military take-over was necessary to protect the territorial integrity 
of the country” due to “insurgencies from ‘ethnic armed organizations.’” 83 The Tatmadaw has 
 
76  UNHRC Report, ¶ 71, 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1643079/files/A_HRC_39_CRP-2-EN.pdf. Myanmar gained 
its independence from Great Britain in 1948.  
77  Id. 
78  Id. ¶ 74. 
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used the alleged “ethnic threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity as the excuse for 
its control of the country….”84 The main concern to those in power was to “maintain power and 
to attain and preserve ‘national unity in the face of ethnic diversity.’ Human rights were 
‘subordinate to these imperatives.’ … Reports of serious human rights violations were 
pervasive….”85 
92. The government found that it could increase its own popularity by, first, instilling 
fear and hatred of the Rohingya among the Buddhist majority in Burma and then publicly 
oppressing, marginalizing, and persecuting the Rohingya. The U.N. found that “the Rohingya 
have gradually been denied birth registration, citizenship and membership of the political 
community. This lack of legal status and identity is the cornerstone of the oppressive system 
targeting the Rohingya…. It is State-sanctioned and in violation of Myanmar’s obligations under 
international law because it discriminates on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion.”86 The four 
Special Rapporteurs on the human rights situation in Burma appointed by the United Nations 
from 1992 to 201187 concluded, inter alia: 
[S]ince late 1989, the Rohingya citizens of Myanmar … have been 
subjected to persecution based on their religious beliefs involving 
extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary detention, forced 
disappearances, intimidation, gang-rape, forced labour, robbery, 
setting of fire to homes, eviction, land confiscation and population 
resettlement as well as the systematic destruction of towns and 
mosques.88 
[S]ome of these human rights violations may entail categories of 
crimes against humanity or war crimes.89 
Yet, “the Tatmadaw enjoys considerable popularity among the Bamar-Buddhist majority.”90 
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93. Facebook, by its very design, turned out to be the perfect tool for the Burmese 
military and Buddhist extremists to use in promoting their message of religious intolerance and, 
ultimately, ethnic cleansing. The amplification and propagation of hateful, extremist, and 
polarizing messages and the radicalization of users are inevitable results of the algorithms that 
Facebook intentionally and meticulously built into its system. 
 
A. Facebook Participated in Inciting Violence Against the Rohingya 
(2012-2017) 
 
94. On June 8, 2012, there were violent confrontations between Rohingya and ethnic 
Rakhine groups; security forces killed a number of the Rohingya and Muslim homes and shops 
were set on fire and looted.91 In the ensuing weeks and months, the Rohingya suffered more 
killings at the hands of Tatmadaw soldiers, burnings and lootings, sexual and gender-based 
violence, arbitrary arrests, and torture in prison.92 The U.N. Mission drew a direct connection 
between the Burmese government’s use of Facebook and the violence against the Rohingya that 
began in June 2012: 
On 1 June 2012 … the spokesperson of the President of 
Myanmar … posted a statement on his personal Facebook account. 
He warned about the arrival from abroad of “Rohingya 
terrorists” … and stated that the Myanmar troops would 
“completely destroy them….” Although this post was later deleted, 
the impact of a high official equating the Rohingya population with 
terrorism may have been significant ahead of the 2012 violence, 
which erupted a week later.93 
[P]osts early in 2012 about the alleged rape and murder by 
Rohingya men of a Buddhist woman were reportedly shared 
widely and are considered to have contributed to the tension and 
violence in Rakhine State in that year.94  
95. Incitement of violence on Facebook continued beyond 2012: “[A]n online news 
report from 30 June 2014 … alleged that two Muslim teashop owners had raped a Buddhist 
woman…. [A prominent Buddhist monk] reposted the article on his Facebook page…. Violence 
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erupted the following day [resulting in two deaths]. The rape allegations were false, with the 
‘victim’ reportedly admitting that she had fabricated the rape allegations.”95 
96. The U.N. Report continued, “[t]here is no doubt that hate speech against Muslims 
in general, and Rohingya in particular, is extremely widespread in Myanmar…. Given 
Facebook’s dominance in Myanmar, the Mission paid specific attention to a number of Facebook 
accounts that appear to be particularly influential….”96 For example: 
•  [T]he late U Ko Ni, a well-known Muslim and legal advisor of the 
NLD, was frequently targeted on Facebook…. In one post from 
March 2016, a photo of U Ko Ni next to president Htin Kyaw was 
captioned ‘this [dog] getting his foot in the door in Myanmar 
politics is not something we should sit by and watch….’ The 
Mission has seen multiple other posts with a similar message and 
threats towards U Ko Ni dating from between March and October 
2016. On 29 January 2017, U Ko Ni was assassinated….97 
• [I]n January 2017, a self-described pro-Myanmar patriot with more 
than 17,000 followers on Facebook posted a graphic video of 
police violence against civilians in another country. He captioned 
the post as follows: “Watch this video. The kicks and beatings are 
very brutal…. [The] disgusting race of [Muslim] terrorists who 
sneaked into our country … need to be beaten like that….” One 
comment under the post reads: “It is very satisfying to watch 
this…. It’s sad that Myanmar security forces are not as skillful in 
their beating.” In July 2018, the post had over 23,000 views, 830 
reactions and 517 shares.98 
• [O]ne account holder, supposedly a monk, posted a poem with 
graphic photos allegedly showing Buddhist Mros killed by the 
“Bengali” on 3 August 2017, along with photos of damage to a 
pagoda allegedly done by “Bengali”.99 (The Myanmar authorities 
refer to the Rohingya as “Bengalis” to suggest that, rather than 
being native to Myanmar, they are illegal immigrants from 
Bangladesh.100) 
• [O]n 11 February 2018, … Shwewiki.com, a self-proclaimed 
“Media/News Company in Yangon” with over 1.3 million 
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followers on Facebook, posted a link to an article titled “The lies 
of the [Rohingya liars] are exposed[.]”101 
97. In a Pulitzer Prize winning report, Reuters found numerous “posts, comments, 
images and videos attacking the Rohingya or other Myanmar Muslims that were on Facebook as 
of [August 2018].” For example: 
• In December 2013, one user posted: “We must fight them the way 
Hitler did the Jews, damn kalars [a pejorative for the Rohingya].” 
• In September 2017, another wrote: “These non-human kalar dogs, 
the Bengalis, are killing and destroying our land, our water and our 
ethnic people…. We need to destroy their race.” 
• In April 2018, another user posted, with a picture of a boatload of 
Rohingya refugees, “Pour fuel and set fire so that they can meet 
Allah faster.”102 
 
98. Facebook was used to instigate communal unrest “in early September 2017, … 
through the parallel distribution of similar but conflicting chain messages on Facebook 
Messenger to Muslim and Buddhist communities. Each chain message stated that the other group 
was preparing for major violence on 11 September and encouraged the recipient to get ready to 
resist…. [T]he messages … caused widespread fear and at least three violent incidents.”103 One 
of the most dangerous campaigns came in 2017, when “the military’s intelligence arm spread 
rumors on Facebook to both Muslim and Buddhist groups that an attack from the other side was 
imminent….”104 
99. Steve Stecklow, author of the Reuters report, observed that several of the posts 
that he and his team catalogued “described Rohingyas as dogs or pigs. ‘This is a way of 
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dehumanising a group,’ Stecklow says. ‘Then when things like genocide happen, potentially 
there may not be a public uproar or outcry as people don’t even view these people as people.’”105  
100. According to Voices that Poison, a U.S.-based human rights group, “speech that 
describes victims as vermin, pests, insects or animals is a rhetorical hallmark of incitement to 
violence, even genocide, because it dehumanises the victim.”106 Fortify Rights, a human rights 
group, similarly noted: “Burmese individuals and groups have disseminated vitriolic Facebook 
posts dehumanizing and calling for widespread attacks against the Rohingya. For example, the 
widely-followed monk Ashin Wirathu, head of the ultranationalist group formerly known as Ma 
Ba Tha, posted a reference to the Rohingya in 2014, saying ‘You can be full of kindness and 
love, but you cannot sleep next to a mad dog. If we are weak, our land will become Muslim.’”107 
101. The New York Times reported that the Myanmar military had posted anti-
Rohingya propaganda on Facebook using fake accounts: 
They posed as fans of pop stars and national heroes as they flooded 
Facebook with their hatred. One said Islam was a global threat to 
Buddhism. Another shared a false story about the rape of Buddhist 
woman by a Muslim man. 
The Facebook posts were not from everyday internet users. 
Instead, they were from Myanmar military personnel who turned 
the social network into a tool for ethnic cleansing, according to 
former military officials, researchers and civilian officials in the 
country. 
* * * 
The Myanmar military’s Facebook operation began several years 
ago, said people familiar with how it worked. The military threw 
major resources at the task, the people said, with as many as 700 
people on it. 
They began by setting up what appears to be news pages and pages 
on Facebook that were devoted to Burmese pop stars, models and 
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other celebrities, like a beauty queen with a penchant for parroting 
military propaganda…. 
Those then became distribution channels for lurid photos, false 
news and inflammatory posts, often aimed at Myanmar’s Muslims, 
the people said. Troll accounts run by the military helped spread 
the content, shout down critics and fuel arguments between 
commenters to rile people up. Often, they posted sham photos of 
corpses that they said were evidence of Rohingya-perpetrated 
massacres, said one of the people. 
Digital fingerprints showed that one major source of the Facebook 
content came from areas outside Naypyidaw, where the military 
keeps compounds, some of the people said.108 
 
102. By October 2015, the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at 
Yale Law School had already concluded that there was “strong evidence that genocide is being 
committed against Rohingya.”109 The worst, however, was yet to come. 
 
 
B. The August 2017 “Clearance Operations” and Their Aftermath: A 
“Human Rights Catastrophe” 
103. The Myanmar military’s campaign of ethnic cleansing culminated in August 2017 
with the “Clearance Operations.” The U.N. reported that “[d]uring the course of the operation 
more than 40 percent of all villages in northern Rakhine State were partially or totally 
destroyed…. As a result, over 725,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh by September 2018.”110 
The August 2017 clearance operations “caused the disintegration of a community and resulted in 
a human rights catastrophe, the effects of which will span generations.”111 Additional “clearance 
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operations” followed in numerous Rohingya villages across northern Rakhine State, with at least 
54 verified locations.112 
104. The U.N. Mission described the clearance operations in six Rohingya villages in 
detail.113 The following description of the operation in one of those villages is typical: 
• “[H]undreds of Tatmadaw soldiers … surrounded [the village]. 
They were accompanied by a smaller number of ethnic Rakhine 
from neighbouring villages. The security forces then opened fire, 
shooting at villagers, including those that were fleeing. Soldiers 
also dragged people from houses and shot some of them at point 
blank range. Others were killed by having their throats slit with 
large knives.”114 
• “During the course of the operation, structures in [the village] were 
burned and destroyed…. Satellite imagery analysis … shows the 
extent of the destruction…. The entire Rohingya village … was 
destroyed, while the nearby non-Rohingya village … remains 
intact.”115 
• “Women and girls were also subjected to rape, gang rape, sexual 
mutilation and sexual humiliation during the ‘clearance 
operations.’”116 
• These “‘clearance operations’ were led by the Tatmadaw…. 
Individuals from the neighbouring ethnic Rakhine village were 
recognised as participants and some ethnic Rakhine men assisted 
the military….”117 
105. The UNHRC Report and the Fortify Rights Report contain numerous first-person 
accounts of atrocities committed against the Rohingya by both Myanmar security forces and by 
civilians during the August 2017 “Clearance Operations.” For example: 
• “The soldiers killed the male members of my family. They shot at 
them first and then slit their throats. The courtyard was full of 
blood. They killed my husband, my father-in-law and my two 
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nephews of 15 and eight years old. They even killed the child in 
the same way.”118 
• “I found my six-month old son’s body lying next to my wife’s 
body. She had been shot. My baby son was stabbed in his stomach 
and his intestine and liver were coming out. When I took his small 
body into my lap, I was showered with his blood.”119 
• “My husband was shot and then he had his throat cut. I was raped. 
It is so difficult to say what happened. They tore off my clothes, 
then six soldiers raped me, and after that two ethnic Rakhine men, 
whom I recognised, raped me. They pressed my breasts and face 
continuously. My face almost turned blue. I knew the ethnic 
Rakhine who lived nearby.”120 
• “I hid in the toilet outhouse, some distance from our house. I saw 
that our house was surrounded by 10 soldiers and some police. I 
was able to see what happened. First they tied up my parents. Then 
they shot my father and raped my mother; later they killed her too. 
After this, they burned our house.”121 
• “One mother described how she had to choose which of her 
children to save. The security forces had entered her house and 
grabbed her young daughter. Her son tried to save his sister and was 
attacked by the security forces. The mother watched from the other 
end of the house and made the split second decision that these two 
children would not live, but that she could perhaps still save her two 
younger children. Her husband returned the next morning to the 
village and dug through the pits of bodies until he found the corpse 
of their son. They never found the body of their daughter. The 
mother told the Mission with haunted eyes: ‘How can I continue 
with my life having made this choice?’”122 
• “I saw my own children killed. Those who are left of my family 
came with me here. My three children and my mother were killed. 
They made them lie down on the ground and they cut the backs of 
their necks.”123 
• “Some small children were thrown into the river…. They hacked 
small children who were half alive. They were breast-feeding age 
children, two years, three years, five years….”124 
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• “The military took and arrested around 50 people. They brought 
them to the military camp … and set fire to where they kept them. 
One was my own brother. There was a small hut, and they put all 
the people in there and set it on fire.”125 
• “As soon as we got on the boat, they shot at us…. Foyezur 
Rahman was my father. My daughter was Sofia. She was 18. They 
were both shot in the back. As soon as the military shot them, they 
stopped moving. We brought their dead bodies here [to 
Bangladesh] and buried them.”126 
• “I saw her taken from the house and raped by military soldiers. It 
happened outside, beside a house. We watched from inside the 
house. After they raped her, they killed her…. [O]ne person [raped 
her], then she was taken to the road, and he cut her neck and cut 
her breasts off.”127 
106. In December 2017, Médicins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) (“MSF”) 
published estimates of Rohingya deaths between August 25 and September 24, 2017—the month 
after the “clearance operations” began—based on surveys of refugees in Bangladesh. MSF 
estimated that “8,170 deaths were due to violence …, including 1,247 children under five years 
of age.… Cause of death by shooting accounted for 69.4% of these deaths; being ‘burned to 
death at home’ accounted for 8.8%; being beaten to death accounted for 5.0%; sexual violence 
leading to death for 2.6%; and death by landmine for 1.0%.”  
107. MSF noted that “the rates of mortality captured here are likely to be 
underestimates, as the data does not account for those people who have not yet been able to flee 
Myanmar, or for families who were killed in their entirety.”128 The U.N. Mission similarly 
“concluded that the estimated number of more than 10,000 deaths during the August-September 
2017 ‘clearance operations’ alone is likely to be conservative.”129 
 
125  Id. at 62. 
126  Id. at 65. 
127  Id. at 69. 
128  Rohingya crisis – a summary of findings from six pooled surveys, MÉDICINS SANS 
FRONTIÈRES (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.msf.org/myanmarbangladesh-rohingya-crisis-summary-
findings-six-pooled-surveys. 































   




108. Most of the Rohingya who escaped the clearance operations now live in “a 
miserable slum of a million people” in Bangladesh. Time reported in 2019 that “[c]onditions in 
the [refugee] camps remain abysmal. Most refugees live in small shacks made of bamboo and 
tarpaulin sheets, so tightly packed together that they can hear their neighbors talking, having sex, 
and disciplining their children or, sometimes, wives. In the springtime, the huts turn into saunas. 
In the monsoon season, daily rainfall turns hilly footpaths into waterslides and lifts trash and 
human waste from open drains to float in stagnant pools.” “[M]urders and other forms of 
violence occur almost nightly inside the camps and are rarely if ever investigated.”130 “The 
Rohingya are …, with no access to meaningful work, entirely dependent on humanitarian aid…. 
These factors increase vulnerability, in particular for women and girls, to trafficking and other 
exploitation.”131 According to Steven Corliss of the U.N. refugee agency, UNHCR, “The 
situation is untenable: environmentally, socially and economically.”132 
109. Plaintiff and the Class have been deprived of their property, including their homes 
and the land they cultivated for generations. In an update to its 2018 Report, the U.N. Mission 
wrote: 
The Mission concludes on reasonable grounds that the Government 
undertook a concerted effort to clear and destroy and then 
confiscate and build on the lands from which it forcibly displaced 
hundreds of thousands of Rohingya. The consequences are two-
fold. This government-led effort subjugates Rohingya to inhumane 
living conditions as [internally displaced persons] and refugees by 
denying them access to their land, keeping them uprooted from 
their homes, depriving them of their to ability to progress in 
healthy and safe communities and preventing them from engaging 
in livelihood activities that sustain them as a people. The second 
consequence of the Government’s four-pronged approach of 
clearing, destroying, confiscating and building on land is that it is 
fundamentally altering the demographic landscape of the area by 
 
130  Feliz Solomon, ‘We’re Not Allowed to Dream.’ Rohingya Muslims Exiled to Bangladesh 
Are Stuck in Limbo Without an End in Sight, TIME (May 23, 2019), 
https://time.com/longform/rohingya-muslims-exile-bangladesh/. 
131  UNHRC Report, ¶ 1174, 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1643079/files/A_HRC_39_CRP-2-EN.pdf. 
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cementing the demographic re-engineering of Rakhine State that 
resulted from mass displacement. Much of this is being done under 
the guise of ‘development,’ with a clear discourse emerging to this 
effect in the immediate aftermath of the August 2017 ‘clearance 
operations.’133 
 
110. In addition to loss of life, physical injuries, emotional trauma, and destruction or 
taking of property, Plaintiff and the Class have been deprived of their culture and community. 
The Rohingya people have their own language, not spoken anywhere else in the world. They 
have lost their traditional places of worship. Family and community ties dating back generations 
have been torn apart. 
111. Having become refugees in foreign countries where they largely do not speak the 
language, have no financial resources, and lack knowledge of the culture or legal system, 
Plaintiff and the Class have been denied meaningful justice. Most Class members have been 
attempting to recover from severe physical and/or emotional trauma and struggling to survive in 
dangerous, overcrowded refugee camps in Bangladesh—thousands of miles from any court 
having jurisdiction over Facebook—since they were forced from Myanmar. 
112. The U.N. concluded that “[t]he attack on the Rohingya population of Myanmar 
was horrendous in scope. The images of an entire community fleeing from their homes across 
rivers and muddy banks, carrying their babies and infants and elderly, their injured and dying, 
will and must remain burned in the minds of the international community. So will the ‘before 
and after’ satellite imagery, revealing whole villages literally wiped off the map. In much of 
northern Rakhine State, every trace of the Rohingya, their life and community as it has existed 
for decades, was removed…. The ‘clearance operations’ were indeed successful.”134 
113. Among the U.N. Mission’s findings were: 
• The elements of the crime of genocide were satisfied. “The 
Mission is satisfied that the Rohingya … constitute a protected 
 
133   Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
Myanmar, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-
Myanmar/20190916/A_HRC_42_CRP.5.pdf, (“UNHRC 2019 Report”) ¶ 139. 































   




group.”135 “The gross human rights violations … suffered by the 
Rohingya at the hands of the Tatmadaw and other security forces 
(often in concert with civilians) include conduct that falls with four 
of [the] five categories of prohibited acts,” including killings, 
serious bodily and mental harm, conditions of life calculated to 
physically destroy the Rohingya, and measures intended to prevent 
births.136 “The Mission … concludes, on reasonable grounds, that 
the factors allowing the inference of genocidal intent are 
present.”137  
• “The Mission finds that crimes against humanity have been 
committed in … Rakhine [State], principally by the Tatmadaw…. 
[T]hese include crimes against humanity of murder; 
imprisonment[;] enforced disappearance; torture; rape, sexual 
slavery and other forms of sexual violence; persecution; and 
enslavement.”138 
114. In its 2019 report, the U.N. Mission reaffirmed its earlier conclusions: “the 
Mission concludes on reasonable grounds that, since the publication of the Mission’s 2018 
report, the Government has committed the crimes against humanity of ‘other inhumane acts’ and 
‘persecution’ in the context of a continued widespread and systematic attack against the 
Rohingya civilian population in furtherance of a State policy to commit such an attack.”139 
Furthermore, the Mission concluded that “the evidence supports an inference of genocidal intent 
and, on that basis, that the State of Myanmar breached its obligation not to commit genocide 
under the Genocide Convention under the rules of State responsibility.”140 
C. Facebook’s Role in the 2017 “Clearance Operations” 
115. The U.N. Mission specifically found that Facebook had contributed to the 2017 
Clearance Operations: 
The Mission has examined documents, … Facebook posts and 
audio-visual materials that have contributed to shaping public 
opinion on the Rohingya…. The analysis demonstrates that a 
carefully crafted hate campaign has developed a negative 
 
135  Id. ¶ 1391. 
136  Id. ¶ 1392. 
137  Id. ¶ 1441. 
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139  UNHRC 2019 Report, ¶ 214, 
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perception of Muslims among the broad population in Myanmar…. 
This hate campaign, which continues to the present day, portrays 
the Rohingya … as an existential threat to Myanmar and to 
Buddhism…. It is accompanied by dehumanising language and the 
branding of the entire [Rohingya] community as ‘illegal Bengali 
immigrants.’ This discourse created a conducive environment for 
the 2012 and 2013 anti-Muslim violence in Rakhine State and 
beyond, without strong opposition from the general population. It 
also enabled the hardening of repressive measures against the 
Rohingya and Kaman in Rakhine State and subsequent waves of 
State-led violence in 2016 and 2017.141 
 
116. The Guardian described the work of two analysts who noted a strong correlation 
between the amount of hate speech on Facebook and the violence inflicted on the Rohingya in 
late 2017: 
Digital researcher and analyst Raymond Serrato examined about 
15,000 Facebook posts from supporters of the hardline nationalist 
Ma Ba Tha group. The earliest posts dated from June 2016 and 
spiked on 24 and 25 August 2017, when ARSA Rohingya militants 
attacked government forces, prompting the security forces to 
launch the ‘clearance operation’ that sent hundreds of thousands of 
Rohingya pouring over the border. 
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Serrato’s analysis showed that activity within the anti-Rohingya 
group, which has 55,000 members, exploded with posts registering 
a 200% increase in interactions. 
‘Facebook definitely helped certain elements of society to 
determine the narrative of the conflict in Myanmar,’ Serrato told 
the Guardian. ‘Although Facebook had been used in the past to 
spread hate speech and misinformation, it took on greater potency 
after the attacks.’ 
* * * 
Alan Davis, an analyst from the Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting who led a two-year study of hate speech in Myanmar, 
said that in the months before August he noticed posts on 
Facebook becoming ‘more organised and odious, and more 
militarised.’ 
His research team encountered fabricated stories stating that 
‘mosques in Yangon are stockpiling weapons in an attempt to blow 
up various Buddhist pagodas and Shwedagon pagoda,’ the most 
sacred Buddhist site in Yangon in a smear campaign against 
Muslims. These pages also featured posts calling Rohingya the 
derogatory term ‘kalars’ and ‘Bengali terrorists.’ Signs denoting 
‘Muslim-free’ areas were shared more than 11,000 times. 
* * * 
Davis said … ‘I think things are so far gone in Myanmar right 
now ... I really don’t know how Zuckerberg and co sleep at night. 
If they had any kind of conscience they would be pouring a good 
percentage of their fortunes into reversing the chaos they have 
created.’142 
117. The Myanmar military used Facebook to justify the “clearance operations” in 
2017: 
• “In a post from the official Facebook page of the Office of the 
Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief, … [a Myanmar parable about a 
camel which gradually takes more and more space in his 
merchant’s tent, until eventually the merchant is forced out] was 
explained in detail in connection with the issue of the Rohingya in 
Rakhine State…. Prior to its deletion by Facebook in August 2018, 
the post had almost 10,000 reactions, over 6,000 shares and 146 
comments.”143 
 
142  Libby Hogan, Michael Safi, Revealed: Facebook hate speech exploded in Myanmar 
during Rohingya crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/03/revealed-facebook-hate-speech-exploded-in-
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• “[I]n a 21 September 2017 post on Facebook … [the Tatmadaw] 
Commander-in-Chief … states that, ‘the Bengali population 
exploded and the aliens tried to seize the land of the local 
ethnics….’”144 
• “[O]n 11 October 2017 the Commander-in-Chief … posted: ‘there 
is exaggeration to say that the number of Bengali fleeing to 
Bangladesh is very large.’ At the time more than 600,000 
Rohingya had fled … Myanmar in a period of six weeks.”145 
• “On 27 October 2017, in another Facebook post entitled ‘every 
citizen has the duty to safeguard race, religion, cultural identities 
and national interest,’ [the] Commander-in-Chief stated that ‘all 
must … preserve the excellent characteristics of the country 
…’”146 
 
118. Rolling Stone reported that “[m]ore shocking was how [the military’s] bigoted 
doctrine was parroted by Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning human-rights icon 
and de facto leader of Myanmar…. When she finally broke her silence, on Facebook, nearly two 
weeks after the 2017 attacks began, it was in cold defense of the same military that kept her 
under house arrest for 15 years when she was the country’s leading dissident. Suu Kyi blamed 
‘terrorists’ for promoting a ‘huge iceberg of misinformation’ about the violence engulfing 
Rakhine. She made no mention of the Rohingya exodus.”147 
119.  The U.N. additionally found that there was “no doubt that the prevalence of hate 
speech in Myanmar significantly contributed to increased tension and a climate in which 
individuals and groups may become more receptive to incitement and calls for violence. This 
also applies to hate speech on Facebook.”148 In early 2018, U.N. investigator Yanghee Lee 
warned that “Facebook has become a beast,” and that “we know that the ultra-nationalist 
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Buddhists have their own Facebooks and are really inciting a lot of violence and a lot of hatred 
against the Rohingya or other ethnic minorities.”149 
D. Civilian Participation in the 2017 “Clearance Operations” 
120. The radicalization of the Burmese population, to which Facebook materially 
contributed, did not merely ensure tolerance of and support for the military’s campaign of 
genocide against the Rohingya, it also allowed the military to recruit, equip, and train “civilian 
death squads” that would actively participate in the atrocities.150  
121. The U.N. Mission drew a connection between anti-Rohingya reporting and hate 
speech, ethnic tension, and the ability of the military to recruit non-Rohingya civilians to 
perpetrate violence against the Rohingya, finding:  
• “The inflammatory nature of much of this reporting [on activities 
of Rohingya militants], often characterizing Rohingya as ‘Bengali 
terrorists,’ coupled with rising vitriolic discourse and hate speech 
against the Rohingya, fuelled an already volatile situation.”151 
• “[The reports] deepened inter-communal suspicion and fear. They 
were likely a factor in a notable breakdown in the relationship 
between the communities, particularly in the weeks leading up to 
25 August 2017.”152 
• “During this period [beginning in late 2016], the Myanmar 
authorities made increasing efforts to recruit ethnic Rakhine as 
members of the security apparatus…. Moreover, the recruitment of 
non-Rohingya to Government supported militias … continued 
throughout this period in Rakhine State.”153 
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122. In a 162-page report based on 254 interviews, the human rights group Fortify 
Rights documented how, in August 2017, “Myanmar authorities … activated non-Rohingya 
civilian squads, some of whom the authorities previously armed and/or trained. These civilian 
perpetrators … acted under the Myanmar military and police in razing hundreds of Rohingya 
villages throughout northern Rakhine State, brutally killing masses of unarmed Rohingya men, 
women, and children.”154 The title of the report, “They Gave Them Long Swords,” referred to an 
eyewitness account of Myanmar soldiers arming non-Rohingya civilians.155 
123. In a chapter of its report entitled “Criminal Acts Against Rohingya by Civilian 
Perpetrators Since August 25, 2017,” Fortify Rights stated: 
After arming and training local non-Rohingya citizens who had a 
demonstrated history of hostility toward Rohingya Muslims in 
northern Rakhine State, the Myanmar authorities activated them on 
August 25…. Groups of local non-Rohingya citizens, in some 
cases trained, armed, and operating alongside Myanmar security 
forces, murdered Rohingya men, women, and children, destroyed 
and looted Rohingya property, and assisted the Myanmar Army 
and Police in razing villages.156 
 
124. In a Facebook post on September 22, 2017, the Burmese Commander-in-Chief 
“encouraged further cooperation between local non-Rohingya citizens and the Myanmar 
military, saying ‘[l]ocal ethnics can strengthen the defense prowess by living in unity and by 
joining hands with the administrative bodies and security forces in oneness.’”157 
E. Facebook Ignored Complaints of Hate Speech on its Website 
125. Because Myanmar’s history of repressive military rule and ethnic violence was 
well-documented by the time Facebook became widely available in Myanmar around 2012, 
Facebook should have known that its product could be used to spread hate speech and 
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misinformation. In addition, beginning in 2013, Facebook was repeatedly alerted to hate speech 
on its system: 
• In 2013, a new civil society organization called Panzagar, meaning 
“flower speech,” was formed in Myanmar.158 The group spoke out 
locally about anti-Muslim hate speech directed at the Rohingya 
minority that was proliferating on Facebook. One of the group’s 
awareness-raising methods was to put flowers in their mouths to 
symbolize speaking messages of peace versus hate. Panzagar 
reported instances of hate speech to Facebook.159 
• In November 2013, Aela Callan, an Australian documentary 
filmmaker, “met at Facebook’s California headquarters with Elliott 
Schrage, vice president of communications and public policy” to 
discuss a project she had begun regarding “hate speech and false 
reports that had spread online during conflicts between Buddhists 
and Rohingya Muslims the prior year…. I was trying to alert him to 
the problems she said….” But “[h]e didn’t connect me with anyone 
inside Facebook who could deal with the actual problem….”160 
• “On March 3, 2014, Matt Schissler [an American aid worker 
working in Myanmar], was invited to join a call with Facebook on 
the subject of dangerous speech online…. Toward the end of the 
meeting, Schissler gave a stark recounting of how Facebook was 
hosting dangerous Islamophobia. He detailed the dehumanizing and 
disturbing language people were using in posts and the doctored 
photos and misinformation being spread widely.”161 
• By June 14, 2014, Al Jazeera had published an article entitled 
“Facebook in Myanmar: Amplifying Hate Speech?” In that article, 
a civil society activist was quoted as saying: “Since the violence in 
Rakhine state began, we can see that online hate speech is spreading 
and becoming more and more critical and dangerous…. I think 
Facebook is the most effective way of spreading hate speech. It’s 
already very widespread, infecting the hearts of people.” The article 
cited Facebook posts reading: “We should kill every Muslim. No 
Muslims should be in Myanmar”; “Why can’t we kick out the 
 
158  Hereward Holland, Facebook in Myanmar: Amplifying Hate Speech?, AL JAZEERA 
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Muslim dogs?”; and “all terrorists are Muslim … they kill innocent 
men and women so peace and Islam are not related.”162 
• On August 18, 2014, PRI’s “The World” program published a story
entitled “In newly liberated Myanmar, hatred spreads on
Facebook.” After describing several false rumors that led to
violence, the article reported: “The pattern repeats in towns and
villages across Myanmar. Rumors rip through communities, fueled
by seething racism and embellishments. Graphic images of violence
are shared virally through social media platforms like Facebook,
which has become one of the most popular websites in the
country….”163 
• After the March 2014 call with Schissler, “a handful of Facebook
employees started an informal working group to connect Facebook
employees in Menlo Park with activists in Myanmar.”164 Schissler
said that “between March and December 2014, he held [a series] of
discussions with Facebook officials…. He told them how the 
platform was being used to spread hate speech and false rumors in 
Myanmar, he said, including via fake accounts.”165 
• “In March 2015, Schissler gave a talk at Facebook’s California
headquarters about new media, particularly Facebook, and anti-
Muslim violence in Myanmar.”166 “In a small conference room
where roughly a dozen Facebook employees had gathered, with
others joining by video-conference, he shared a PowerPoint
presentation that documented the seriousness of what was
happening in Myanmar: hate speech on Facebook was leading to
real-world violence in the country, and it was getting people
killed.”167 One Facebook employee asked whether Schissler thought
genocide could happen in Myanmar: “‘Absolutely’ he answered. If
Myanmar continued on its current path, and the anti-Muslim hate
speech grew unabated, a genocide was possible. No one followed
up on the question.”168
162 Hereward Holland, Facebook in Myanmar: Amplifying Hate Speech?, AL JAZEERA 
(Jun. 14, 2014), https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/6/14/facebook-in-myanmar-
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• “‘They were warned so many times,’ said David Madden, a tech
entrepreneur who worked in Myanmar. He said he told Facebook
officials in 2015 that its platform was being exploited to foment
hatred in a talk he gave at its headquarters in Menlo Park,
California. About a dozen Facebook people attended the meeting in
person…. Others joined via video. ‘It couldn’t have been presented 
to them more clearly, and they didn’t take the necessary steps,’ 
Madden said.”169 
• Brooke Binkowski, who worked for an organization that did fact-
checking for Facebook beginning in early 2017, “said she tried to
raise concerns about misuse of the platform abroad, such as the
explosion of hate speech and misinformation during the Rohingya
crisis in Myanmar…. ‘I was bringing up Myanmar over and over 
and over,’ she said. ‘They were absolutely resistant.’ Binkowski, 
who previously reported on immigration and refugees, said 
Facebook largely ignored her: ‘I strongly believe that they are 
spreading fake news on behalf of hostile foreign powers and 
authoritarian governments as part of their business model.’”170 
126. Facebook’s response to such warnings about hate speech on its websites in Burma
was, however, utterly ineffective. The extreme import of what Matt Schissler was describing 
“didn’t seem to register with the Facebook representatives. They seemed to equate the harmful 
content with cyberbullying: Facebook wanted to discourage people from bulling across the 
system, he said, and they believed that the same set of tools they used to stop a high school 
senior from intimidating an incoming freshman could be used to stop Buddhist monks in 
Myanmar from spreading malicious conspiracy theories about Rohingya Muslims.”171 
127. Facebook had almost no capability to monitor the activity of millions of users in
Burma: “In 2014, the social media behemoth had just one content reviewer who spoke Burmese: 
a local contractor in Dublin, according to messages sent by Facebook employees in the private 
Facebook chat group. A second Burmese speaker began working in early 2015, the messages 
show.” Accenture, to whom Facebook outsourced the task of monitoring for violations of its 
169 Steve Stecklow, Why Facebook is losing the war on hate speech in Myanmar, REUTERS 
(Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/. 
170 Sam Levin, ‘They don’t care’: Facebook factchecking in disarray as journalists push to 
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community standards in Burma and other Asian countries, did not hire its first two Burmese 
speakers, who were based in Manila, until 2015. Former monitors “said they didn’t actually 
search for hate speech themselves; instead, they reviewed a giant queue of posts mostly reported 
by Facebook users.” Chris Tun, a Deloitte consultant who had arranged meetings between the 
Burmese government and Facebook, told Reuters: “Honestly, Facebook had no clue about 
Burmese content. They were totally unprepared.”172 
128. Instead, Facebook tried initially to rely entirely on users to report inappropriate 
posts. However, “[a]lthough Myanmar users at the time could post on Facebook in Burmese, the 
platform’s interface – including its system for reporting problematic posts – was in English.”173 
129. In one case in 2018, Mark Zuckerberg was forced to apologize for exaggerating 
Facebook’s monitoring capabilities. In an interview with Vox, Zuckerberg cited “one incident 
where Facebook detected that people were trying to spread ‘sensational messages’ through 
Facebook Messenger to incite violence on both sides of the conflict” but claimed that “the 
messages were detected and stopped from going through.”174 In response, a group of activists 
issued an open letter criticizing Zuckerberg and pointing out that Facebook had not detected the 
messages; rather, the activists had “flagged the messages repeatedly to Facebook, barraging its 
employees with strongly worded appeals until the company finally stepped in to help.” 
Zuckerberg apologized in an email: “I apologize for not being sufficiently clear about the 
important role that your organizations play in helping us understand and respond to Myanmar-
related issues, including the September incident you referred to.”175 
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130. Reuters’ Steve Stecklow sent the examples of hate speech that he and his team
had found on the system, some of which was “extremely violent and graphic,” to Facebook: “It 
was sickening to read…. When I sent it to Facebook, I put a warning on the email saying I just 
want you to know these are very disturbing things…. What was so remarkable was that [some 
of] this had been on Facebook for five years and it wasn’t until we notified them in August [of 
2018] that it was removed.”176 
131. “The [U.N.] Mission itself experienced a slow and ineffective response from
Facebook when it used the standard reporting mechanism to alert the company to a post targeting 
a human rights defender for his alleged cooperation with the Mission.” “The post described the 
individual as a ‘national traitor,’ consistently adding the adjective ‘Muslim.’ It was shared and 
reposted over 1,000 times. Numerous comments to the post explicitly called for the person to be 
killed, in unequivocal terms: … ‘If this animal is still around, find him and kill him….’ ‘He is a 
Muslim. Muslims are dogs and need to be shot….’ ‘Remove his whole race.’ … In the weeks 
and months after the post went online, the human rights defender received multiple death threats 
from Facebook users….” “The Mission reported this post to Facebook on four occasions; in each 
instance the response received was that the post was examined but ‘doesn’t go against one of 
[Facebook’s] specific Community Standards.’ … The post was finally removed several weeks 
later but only through the support of a contact at Facebook, not through the official channel. 
Several months later, however, the Mission found at least 16 re-posts of the original post still 
circulating on Facebook.”177 
132. On February 25, 2015, Susan Benesch, a human rights lawyer and researcher who
directs the Dangerous Speech Project at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at 
Harvard University, gave a presentation entitled “The Dangerous Side of Language” at 
Facebook. The presentation showed how anti-Rohingya speech being disseminated by Facebook 
176 Anisa Sudebar, The country where Facebook posts whipped up hate, BBC TRENDING 
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the Rohingya and manipulated the public into supporting their 
military onslaught.179 
Apparently not eager to help prove that Facebook had been 
complicit in genocide, Facebook’s lawyers denied Smith’s requests 
for access to the data: “‘Facebook had the chance to do the right 
thing again and again, but they didn’t. Not in Myanmar,’ said 
Smith. ‘It was a decision, and they chose not to help.’”180 
 
134. Worst yet, Facebook’s activity promoted such content to its users, thus actively 
participating in disinformation efforts that led to the genocide. 
135. Facebook ultimately ratified its conduct and its involvement of the genocide and 
violence in Burma by admitting shortcomings of its system. 
 
F. Facebook Admits That It Had a Responsibility to Prevent Its Product 
 From Being Used to Incite Violence and Genocide 
136. In 2018, after the “clearance operations,” several senior Facebook executives, 
including Mark Zuckerberg, belatedly admitted that the company had a responsibility to prevent 
its product from being used to incite violence in Burma and should have done more in that 
regard. On April 10, 2018, Zuckerberg testified before the U.S. Senate: 
SEN. PATRICK LEAHY: ... [S]ix months ago, I asked your 
general counsel about Facebook’s role as a breeding ground for 
hate speech against Rohingya refugees. Recently, U.N. 
investigators blamed Facebook for playing a role in inciting 
possible genocide in Myanmar. And there has been genocide 
there…. 
This is the type of content I’m referring to. It calls for the death of 
a Muslim journalist. Now, that threat went straight through your 
detection system, it spread very quickly, and then it took attempt 
after attempt after attempt, and the involvement of civil society 
groups, to get you to remove it.  
Why couldn’t it be removed within 24 hours? 
ZUCKERBERG: Senator, what’s happening in Myanmar is a 
terrible tragedy, and we need to do more.... 
 
 
179  Sheera Frenkel and Cecilia Kang, An Ugly Truth: Inside Facebook’s Battle for 
Domination, at 185-86 (HarperCollins 2021). 






























   




LEAHY: We all agree with that.181 
 
137. In a statement to Reuters, Mia Garlick, Facebook’s director of Asia Pacific 
Policy, stated: “We were too slow to respond to concerns raised by civil society, academics and 
other groups in Myanmar. We don’t want Facebook to be used to spread hatred and incite 
violence. This … is especially true in Myanmar where our services can be used to amplify hate 
or exacerbate harm against the Rohingya.”182 
138. In August 2018, Sara Su, a Product Manager, posted on Facebook’s blog: 
We have a responsibility to fight abuse on Facebook. This is 
especially true in countries like Myanmar where many people are 
using the internet for the first time and social media can be used to 
spread hate and fuel tension on the ground. 
The ethnic violence in Myanmar is horrific and we have been too 
slow to prevent misinformation and hate on Facebook.183 
139. On September 5, 2018, Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg testified before the U.S. 
Senate: 
SEN. MARK WARNER: … Ms. Sandberg, you made mention in 
your opening testimony the fact that sometimes political actors are 
using the platforms really to incent violence. I mean, I think 
you’ve made at least some reference, mention of Myanmar. We’ve 
obviously seen a great tragedy take place there where hundreds of 
thousands of Rohingya Muslims are fleeing and in many ways. 
The U.N. High Commissioner has said that fake accounts on 
Facebook have incented that violence. Do you believe that 
Facebook has both a moral obligation and potentially even a 
legal obligation to take down accounts that are actually 
incentivizing violence? 
 
181  Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data, Senate Hearing 115-
683 before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, et al., 115th Cong. (Apr. 10, 
2018), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg37801/html/CHRG-
115shrg37801.htm. 
182  Steve Stecklow, Why Facebook is losing the war on hate speech in Myanmar, REUTERS 
(Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/ 
(emphasis added). 































   




SHERYL SANDBERG: I strongly believe that. In the case of 
what’s happened in Myanmar, it’s, it’s devastating and we’re 
taking aggressive steps and we know we need to do more….184 
 
140. In October 2018, BSR (Business for Social Responsibility) published a human 
rights impact assessment—commissioned by Facebook itself—of Facebook’s presence in 
Burma; BSR found that: 
• “Facebook is … used to spread rumors about people and events. 
Character assassinations were described to BSR during this 
assessment, and in extreme cases these have extended to online 
death threats…. There are indications that organized groups make 
use of multiple fake accounts and news pages to spread hate 
speech, fake news, and misinformation for political gain. Rumors 
spread on social media have been associated with communal 
violence and mob justice.”185 
• “The Facebook platform in Myanmar is being used by bad actors 
to spread hate speech, incite violence, and coordinate harm…. 
Facebook has become a means for those seeking to spread hate and 
cause harm, and posts have been linked to offline violence…. [F]or 
example, the Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on Myanmar describes how Facebook has been used by 
bad actors to spread anti-Muslim, anti-Rohingya, and anti-activist 
sentiment.”186 
• “The consequences for the victim are severe, with lives and bodily 
integrity placed at risk from incitement to violence.”187 
 
141. On November 5, 2018, Alex Warofka, Facebook’s Product Policy Manager, 
issued a statement on the BSR report: “The report concludes that, prior to this year, we weren’t 
doing enough to help prevent our platform from being used to foment division and incite offline 
violence. We agree that we can and should do more.”188 
 
184  Open Hearing on Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media Platforms, Senate 
Hearing 115-460 before the Select Comm. of Intel., 115th Cong. (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg31350/html/CHRG-115shrg31350.htm. 
185  BSR Report, at 13, https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/bsr-facebook-
myanmar-hria_final.pdf. 
186  Id. at 24. 
187  Id. at 35. 
188  Alex Warofka, An Independent Assessment of the Human Rights Impact of Facebook in 































   




142. In October 2021, a former member of Facebook’s Integrity Team submitted a 
sworn whistleblower declaration to the SEC. It stated, inter alia:  
At Facebook, … there’s no will to actually fix problems, in 
particular if doing so might reduce user engagement, and therefore 
profits…. 
Any projects Facebook undertakes under the banner of charity or 
community building are actually intended to drive engagement…. 
Internet.org, Facebook’s scheme to provide Internet to the 
developing world, wasn’t about charity…. Inside the company, 
the dialogue was that this is about gaining an impenetrable 
foothold in order to harvest data from untapped markets. 
Through Internet.org, which provided Facebook at free or greatly 
reduced rates in key markets, Facebook effectively became the 
Internet for people in many developing countries…. [Facebook 
executives would] say ‘When you are the sole source for the 
Internet you are the sole source for news.’ 
Facebook executives often use data to confuse, rather than clarify 
what is occurring. There is a conscious effort to answer questions 
from regulators in ways that intentionally downplay the severity of 
virtually any given issue…. 
An[] example of their playbook played out in the wake of the 
genocide of the Rohingya refugees in Myanmar, a country where 
Facebook was effectively the Internet for most people, and where 
the long-isolated population was vulnerable to information 
manipulation. Facebook executives were fully aware that posts 
ordering hits by the Myanmar government on the minority 
Muslim Rohingya were spreading wildly on Facebook, because 
it was being reported in the media and multiple aid-organizations, 
as well as major, top-tier reporters who used to call the company 
when they discovered early on that the genocide was being 
accommodated on Facebook. It was clear before the killing even 
started that members of the military junta in Myanmar were 
directing this activity. But, when the violence of the early stages of 
the Myanmar government-directed genocide metastasized and the 
murders were unmistakably being directed on Facebook, I was 
instructed to tell the media, “We know now, and we finally 
managed to remove their access, but we did not have enough 
Burmese-speaking moderators.” This part was true; there was only 
one Burmese translator on the team of moderators for years, in the 
same period when the communications apparatus grew by leaps 
and bounds. But the issue of the Rohingya being targeted on 
Facebook was well known inside the company for years. I 
refused to deploy the approved talking point. 
Later, after widespread public blowback forced the company to 
hire a human rights group to conduct an independent review, 
Facebook’s policy manager Alex Warofka released a statement 






























   




can and should do more.’ I quickly realized that the company was 
giving a PR response to a genocide that they accommodated—that, 
I, working for Facebook, had been a party to genocide. This is 
what prompted me to look for another job.189 
143. Facebook’s subsequent actions prove that, for an investment amounting to a 
miniscule portion of the company’s vast resources,190 the company could have blocked much of 
the hate speech against the Rohingya. In August 2018, Facebook posted on its website:  
The ethnic violence in Myanmar has been truly horrific…. While 
we were too slow to act, we’re now making progress—with better 
technology to identify hate speech, improved reporting tools, and 
more people to review content. 
Today, we are taking more action in Myanmar, removing a total of 
18 Facebook accounts, one Instagram account and 52 Facebook 
Pages, followed by almost 12 million people. We are preserving 
data, including content, on the accounts and Pages we have 
removed.191 
 
144. In December 2018, Facebook updated its blog to report that it removed an 
additional “425 Facebook Pages, 17 Facebook Groups, 135 Facebook accounts and 15 Instagram 
accounts in Myanmar for engaging in coordinated inauthentic behavior on Facebook…. [W]e 
discovered that these seemingly independent news, entertainment, beauty and lifestyle Pages 
were linked to the Myanmar military.”192 
145. Rosa Birch, head of Facebook’s Strategic Response Team, told NBC in 2019 that 
“the team worked on a new tool that allows approved non-governmental organizations to flag 
problematic material they see on Facebook in a way that is seen more quickly by the company 
than if a regular user reported the material. ‘It sounds relatively simple, and something that we 
 
189  Emphasis added.  
190  Between 2011 and 2017, Facebook reported revenues of $115,357,000,000 and net 
income of $34,893,000,000. Facebook: annual revenue and net income 2007-2020, STATISTICA 
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/277229/facebooks-
annual-revenue-and-net-income/. 
191  Removing Myanmar Military Officials From Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 28, 
2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-officials/ (emphasis added). 
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should have done a couple of years ago,’ she said.”193 “When hate speech against the Rohingya 
minority in Myanmar spread virulently via Facebook in Burmese (a language spoken by some 42 
million people) Facebook was slow to act because it had no hate-speech detection algorithm in 
Burmese, and few Burmese-speaking moderators. But since the Rohingya genocide, Facebook 
has built a hate-speech classifier in Burmese by pouring resources toward the project. It paid to 
hire 100 Burmese-speaking content moderators, who manually built up a dataset of Burmese hate 
speech that was used to train an algorithm.”194  
146. Recent revelations show, however, that Facebook continues to ignore the harm its
algorithms and product inflict in developing countries. A September 2021 Wall Street Journal 
article based on leaked internal Facebook documents reported: 
Facebook treats harm in developing countries as ‘simply the cost 
of doing business’ in those places, said Brian Boland, a former 
Facebook vice president who oversaw partnerships with internet 
providers in Africa and Asia before resigning at the end of last 
year. Facebook has focused its safety efforts on wealthier markets 
with powerful governments and media institutions, he said, even as 
it has turned to poorer countries for user growth. 
‘There is very rarely a significant, concerted effort to invest in 
fixing those areas,’ he said. 
* * *
An internal Facebook report from March said actors including 
some states were frequently on the platform promoting violence, 
exacerbating ethnic divides and delegitimizing social institutions. 
‘This is particularly prevalent—and problematic—in At Risk 
Countries,’ the report says. 
It continues with a header in bold: ‘Current mitigation strategies 
are not enough.’195 
193 David Ingram, Facebook’s new rapid response team has a crucial task: Avoid fueling 
another genocide, NBC (June 20, 2019), https:/www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-s-
new-rapid-response-team-has-crucial-task-avoid-n1019821 (emphasis added). 
194 Billy Perrigo, Facebook Says It’s Removing More Hate Speech Than Ever Before, But 
There’s a Catch, TIME (Nov. 27, 2019), https://time.com/5739688/facebook-hate-speech-
languages/. 
195 Justin Scheck, Newley Purnell, Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Employees Flag Drug Cartels 
and Human Traffickers. The Company’s Response Is Weak, Documents Show, WALL STREET
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147. The Wall Street Journal article relates one example indicating that Facebook has
learned nothing from its experience in Burma: 
In Ethiopia, armed groups have used Facebook to incite violence. 
The company’s internal communications show it doesn’t have 
enough employees who speak some of the relevant languages to 
help monitor the situation. For some languages, Facebook also 
failed to build automated systems, called classifiers, that could 
weed out the worst abuses…. 
* * *
In a December planning document, a Facebook team wrote that the 
risk of bad consequences in Ethiopia was dire…. It said in some 
high-risk places like Ethiopia, ‘Our classifiers don’t work, and 
we’re largely blind to problems on our site.’ 
Groups associated with the Ethiopian government and state media 
posted inciting comments on Facebook against the Tigrayan 
minority, calling them ‘hyenas’ and ‘a cancer.’ Posts accusing 
Tigrayans of crimes such as money laundering were going viral, 
and some people on the site said the Tigrayans should be wiped 
out. 
Violence escalated toward the end of last year, when the 
government launched an attack on the Tigray capital, Mekelle. 
Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in March that Tigrayans are 
victims of ethnic cleansing.196 
148. Whistleblower Francis Haugen echoed this sentiment, noting that Facebook’s
efforts to train its systems in non-English languages are severely lacking, stating “[o]ne of the 
core things that I’m trying to draw attention to is the underinvestment in languages that aren’t 
English.… Unfortunately the most fragile places in the world are the most diverse when it comes 
to languages.” She goes on to say “I saw a pattern of behavior where I believed there was no 
chance that Facebook would be able to solve these problems in isolation … I saw what I feared 
was going to happen continue to unfurl … I knew I could never live with myself if I watched 10 
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social media.”197 
149. Facebook’s admissions that it should have done more to prevent the genocide in
Burma—and its subsequent efforts, if any—came too late for the tens of thousands of Rohingya 
who have been murdered, raped, and tortured, and for the hundreds of thousands who are now 
living in squalid refugee camps and displaced from their home across the world. 
FACTS SPECIFIC TO JANE DOE 
150. Plaintiff Jane Doe is a Rohingya Muslim woman who previously lived in the
Rakhine State, Burma. 
151. In 2012, Plaintiff was about 16 years old, her father was detained, beaten, and
tortured for two weeks by the Myanmar military. 
152. Around the same time, many young Rohingya girls in Plaintiff’s village and
nearby villages were being taken from their families. Members of the Myanmar military came to 
Plaintiff’s village, and anyone who left their homes was killed. Plaintiff saw at least seven men 
killed, as well as an elderly woman. Plaintiff knew that many others in her village were also 
killed, including women and children, but she could only see those directly in the vicinity of her 
home.  
153. Fearful that she would be abducted and sexually assaulted or killed herself,
Plaintiff’s family eventually urged her to flee Burma alone. 
154. Plaintiff joined a group of Rohingya fleeing by boat to Bangladesh. She traveled
to Thailand and then Malaysia, where the UNHCR eventually arranged for her resettlement in 
the United States. 
155. Plaintiff is gravely concerned about her parents and her sisters, who remain in
Burma. Their homes and the small store that was their livelihood were destroyed during ethnic 
violence. Plaintiff’s family land, home, and personal property were eventually seized and those 
that remained behind in Burma were forced from their homes. They lack any reliable source of 
197 Giulia Saudelli, Facebook whistleblower warns company is neglecting languages other 
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income and live in constant fear of further attacks by the Myanmar military or by Buddhist 
monks. 
156. Plaintiff also has an aunt and uncle who fled to a refugee camp in Bangladesh,
where they have remained for several years. 
157. Plaintiff remains traumatized by the ethnic violence and threats of violence
inflicted on her and her family. 
158. Plaintiff did not learn that Facebook’s conduct was a cause of her injuries until
2021. A reasonable investigation by Plaintiff into the causes of her injuries would not have 
revealed this information prior to 2021 because Facebook’s role in the Rohingyan genocide was 
not widely known or well understood within the Rohingya community. Further, even if such 
information was known to various journalists or investigators at earlier points in time, Plaintiff’s 
ability to discover such information was significantly hindered by her inability to read or write. 
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
159. Class Definition. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following proposed Class
pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382: 
All Rohingya who left Burma (Myanmar) on or after June 1, 2012, 
and arrived in the United States under refugee status, or who 
sought asylum protection, and now reside in the United States. 
The following are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this 
action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, 
successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling 
interest, and its current or former employees, officers, or directors; (3) Plaintiff’s counsel and 
Defendant’s counsel; and (4) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such 
excluded person. 
160. Ascertainability and Numerosity. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable. At least 10,000 members of the Class reside in the United States. 






























   




161. Commonality and Predominance. There are many questions of law and fact 
common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class and those questions predominate over any 
questions that may affect individual members of the Class. These common questions of law and 
fact include: 
• Whether Facebook (the product) contains design defects that 
harmed Rohingya Muslims, and, if so, whether Facebook (the 
company) is strictly liable for them; 
• Whether Facebook owed a duty of care to Rohingya Muslims 
when entering the Burmese market; 
• Whether Facebook breached any duty of care to Rohingya 
Muslims in the way it operated in Burma; and 
• Whether Facebook’s Burmese operations caused harm to Rohingya 
Muslims. 
 
162. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all members of the 
Class. Plaintiff and the other Class members sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s 
uniform wrongful conduct. 
163. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 
Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex class actions 
and particular expertise in litigation involving social media. Plaintiff and her counsel are 
committed to vigorously prosecuting the action on behalf of the Class and have the resources to 
do so. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests adverse to those of the other 
members of the Class. Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 
164. Superiority. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair 
and efficient adjudication of this controversy and joinder of all members of the Class is 
impracticable. The members of the proposed Class are, by definition, recent immigrants and lack 
the tangible resources, language skills, and cultural sophistication to access and participate 
effectively in the prosecution of individual lawsuits in any forum having jurisdiction over 
Defendant. A class action in which the interests of the Class are advanced by representative 






























   




Moreover, duplicative individual litigation of the complex legal and factual controversies 
presented in this Complaint would increase the delay and expense to all parties and impose a 
tremendous burden on the courts. By contrast, a class action would reduce the burden of case 
management and advance the interests of judicial economy, speedy justice, and uniformity of 
decisions. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY 
165. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
166. Facebook makes its social media product widely available to users around the 
world. 
167. Facebook designed its system and the underlying algorithms and in a manner that 
rewarded users for posting, and thereby encouraged and trained them to post, increasingly 
extreme and outrageous hate speech, misinformation, and conspiracy theories attacking 
particular groups. 
168. The design of Facebook’s algorithms and product resulted in the proliferation and 
intensification of hate speech, misinformation, and conspiracy theories attacking the Rohingya in 
Burma, radicalizing users, causing injury to Plaintiff and the Class, as described above. 
Accordingly, through the design of its algorithms and product, Facebook (1) contributed to the 
development and creation of such hate speech and misinformation and (2) radicalized users, 
causing them to tolerate, support, and even participate in the persecution of and ethnic violence 
against Plaintiff and the Class. 
169. Because (1) the persecution of the Rohingya by the military government was 
widely known before Facebook launched its product in Burma and (2) Facebook was repeatedly 
warned after the launch that hate speech and misinformation on the system was likely to result in 
ethnic violence, Facebook knew and had reason to expect that the Myanmar military and non-































   




170. Moreover, the kind of harm resulting from the ethnic violence committed by the 
Myanmar military and their non-Rohingya supporters is precisely the kind of harm that could 
have been reasonably expected from Facebook’s propagation and prioritization of anti-Rohingya 
hate speech and misinformation on its system—e.g., wrongful death, personal injury, pain and 
suffering, emotional distress, and property loss. 
171. The dangers inherent in the design of Facebook’s algorithms and product 
outweigh the benefits, if any, afforded by that design. 
172. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to actual damages proximately caused by the 
defective design of Facebook’s algorithms and system. 
173.  Plaintiff and the Class are further entitled to punitive damages caused by 
Facebook’s failure to correct or withdraw its algorithms and product after Facebook knew about 
their defects. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
NEGLIGENCE 
174. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
175. When operating in Burma—as everywhere—Facebook had a duty to use 
reasonable care to avoid injuring others. 
176. Facebook breached this duty by—among other things—negligently designing its 
algorithms to fill Burmese users’ News Feeds (especially users particularly susceptible to such 
content) with disproportionate amounts of hate speech, misinformation, and other content 
dangerous to Plaintiff and the Class; negligently contributing to the creation of hate speech, 
misinformation, and other content dangerous to Plaintiff and the Class by rewarding (and thus 
encouraging) users to post ever more extreme content; negligently failing to remove such 
dangerous content from its system after having been repeatedly warned of the potential for such 
content to incite violence; negligently making connections between and among violent 
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Facebook in a manner that Facebook knew or should have known would create an unreasonable 
risk to Plaintiff and the Class. 
177. Because (1) the persecution of the Rohingya by the military government was
widely known before Facebook launched its product in Burma and (2) Facebook was repeatedly 
warned after the launch that hate speech and misinformation on the system was likely to result in 
ethnic violence, Facebook knew and had reason to expect that the proliferation of such content 
on its system could incite and facilitate violence and atrocities by the Myanmar military and non-
Rohingya civilians against Plaintiff and the Class. 
178. Moreover, the kind of harm resulting from the ethnic violence committed by the
Myanmar military and their non-Rohingya supporters is precisely the kind of harm that could 
have been reasonably expected from Facebook’s negligent propagation and prioritization of anti-
Rohingya hate speech and misinformation on its system—e.g., wrongful death, personal injury, 
pain and suffering, emotional distress, and property loss. 
179. Facebook’s acts and omissions in breach of its duty of care were a proximate
cause of the persecution of and ethnic violence against—and resulting injuries to—Plaintiff and 
the Class. 
180. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to actual damages proximately caused by
Facebook’s negligence of its algorithms and product. 
181. Plaintiff and the Class are further entitled to punitive damages caused by
Facebook’s failure to correct or withdraw its algorithms and system after Facebook knew about 
their defects. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe, on behalf of herself and the Class, respectfully requests 
that this Court enter an Order: 
A. Certifying the case as a class action on behalf of the Class, as defined above,
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B. Declaring that Defendant is strictly liable for defects, as described above, in its
algorithms and system; and that Defendant, as described above, acted negligently; 
C. Awarding the Class compensatory damages for wrongful death, personal injury,
pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of property, in the amount of at least $150 
billion; 
D. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class punitive damages in an amount to be determined
at trial. 
E. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable litigation expenses and
attorneys’ fees; 
F. Awarding the Plaintiff and the Class pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent
allowable; and 
G. Awarding such other and further relief as equity and justice may require.
JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury for all issues so triable. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JANE DOE, individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated, 
Dated: December 6, 2021 By: 
 One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys 
Rafey S. Balabanian (SBN 315962) 
rbalabanian@edelson.com 
EDELSON PC 
150 California Street, 18th Floor 





































   






350 North LaSalle, 14th Floor 













1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 200 
Washington, DC 20006 
Tel: 833.382.9816 
 
Counsel for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class 
       
      *Admission pro hac vice to be sought.  
